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Political Abuse of Hiring Halls:
Comparative Treatment Under the
NLRA and the LMRDA
Barbara J. Fickt
Union hiring halls provide the essentialservice of referring qualified
job applicants to immediatejob opportunitiesin many industries. Unfortunately, opportunitiessometimes exist for union leaders to abuse hiring hall
mechanisms by manipulatingapplicantreferralstofavorfriendsand disfavor political enemies. The author discusses hiring hall mechanisms and
opportunitiesfor their abuse as well as the prevailing legal theories under
which abusive practices may be combatted. She first focuses on NLRA
provisionswhich forbid union conduct causing a person to be discriminated
against in employment. She then discusses LMRDA provisionsprotecting
union members' internal union political conduct. She argues that suppression of internal union democracy is often at the basis of hiring hall abuse
and concludes that the LMRDA provisions will usually be more suited to
accomplishing the litigant'sgoal of restoring democraticprocedures within
the union.
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INTRODUCTION

The hiring hall in the construction and maritime industries, and to a
lesser extent in the transportation industry, is an essential component of
the employer-employee relationship. In those industries in which it is
prevalent, the hiring hall serves as the mechanism for matching qualified
workers with transient and frequently short-lived employment opportunities. As such, it is a highly desirable institution from both the workers'
and the employers' viewpoints. It is also, however, a system easily subject to abuse and manipulation by those who operate the hall. "A corrupt system in which business agents who refer their cronies or other
favored workers out of sequence on the out-of-work list is no different
from robbery. The victimized worker is having his opportunity for income stolen by those who pretend to be protecting his needs."'
This Article will focus on one aspect of hiring hall abuse-work referral practices aimed at punishing political dissidents within the union.
It will review the prevailing legal theories used to combat this practice
1. Oversight of Operating Engineers, 1984. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1984) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings].
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under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 2 and consider an
alternative legal solution based on the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"). 3
I
THE OPERATION OF UNION HIRING HALLS

Most workers in nonprofessional, nonmanagerial positions obtain
employment by making application directly to an employer.' Thereafter
the employer, based on information contained in the application form
and perhaps obtained in a personal interview, selects among the available
applicants. Because of the strictures placed on employers by federal and
state employment laws, this information tends to be limited to that required to determine if the applicant is qualified to perform the job in an
adequate and safe manner. 5 The personal background of the individual,
unrelated to her employment history, is rarely the subject of inquiry.
This system tends to work satisfactorily where the employer's place
of business is stationary and the employment in question is intended to be
long-term. The prospective employee is easily able to locate the employing entity and determine the existence of a job vacancy, and it is costeffective for the employer to spend time and administrative energy sifting
through the applications in order to choose a worker.
In industries characterized by work which is casual or of short-term
or irregular duration, and by employers with mobile job sites, the conventional hiring methods tend to be inefficient and ineffective. 6 In shipping, there is a need for qualified crews to work for the duration of the
voyage, and for labor gangs to be available when a ship arrives in port for
loading and unloading cargo.7 In construction, contractors require
2. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
3. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
4. In a survey of jobseeking methods used by workers, conducted in January 1973 and covering nearly 16 million workers, the preferred jobseeking method, used by 66% of those surveyed, was
direct application to an employer. This method was also the most effective-48% of all persons who
used this method obtained employment. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 1886, JOBSEEKING METHODS USED BY AMERICAN WORKERS 9 (1975).
5. See 1 W. CONNOLLY & M. CONNOLLY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY § 2.01[3] (1984); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
581-82 (2d ed. 1983); Hrebik, The Hiring Process: What's Legal and Illegal, 9 LEGAL ECON. 20-24
(Jan.-Feb. 1983).
6. Rains, Construction Trades Hiring Halls, 10 LAB. L.J. 363, 368-69 (1959).
7. In the maritime industry, two basic categories of workers are needed: longshoremen who
work the docks and seamen who work on board ship. The number of longshoremen needed to work
at a port varies considerably depending on the number and type of ships in dock. As ships arrive in
port, longshore workers are immediately needed to unload and load cargo. In some cases these jobs
require a few hours of work, in others a few days. There is no continuity of employment or employer. See C. LARROWE, SHAPE-UP AND HIRING HALL 2, 49 (1955); Hiring Halls in the Maritime
Industry, 1950." Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1950) (hereinafter Hearings on Hir-
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skilled workers in various craft fields. These skilled craft workers will
rarely be employed for the duration of the building project; rather, different crafts are required at various stages and in varying numbers during
the construction process.'
The hiring hall system acts to alleviate the problems encountered by
both employers and employees in these types of industries.9 A unioning Halls in the Maritime Industry]; Fenton, The Taft-Hartley Act and Union Controlof Hiring-A
CriticalExamination, 4 VILL. L. REV. 339, 341 (1959). Among seamen, there is a regular turnover
when a ship docks, due to the prolonged absence from home during a voyage. Ships, however,
operate steadily and must be able to replace crews during the few days the ship is in port. Hearings
on HiringHalls in the MaritimeIndustry, supra, at 36, 44, 47, 60-61; Williams, HiringHalls in the
Maritime Industry under Federal Law, 8 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV. 178 (1953).
8. The construction industry is characterized by work performed at separate work sites at
different locations. Most construction employers do not employ a steady workforce of construction
labor. Rather, as each project begins, the employer hires the workers needed for that particular
project. As the project progresses, there is a constant turnover of employees based on craft and job
duration. A heavy equipment operator, needed to prepare a construction site, will not be required to
set up floor slabs and building frames. Once her particular job is completed at that site, she is
available for work elsewhere. The contractor continues to need other types of skilled workers on the
project--e.g., laborers, carpenters, plumbers-who are hired as the need arises. Thus, during the
course of a year, a construction worker will work for several different employers at various sites. See
Bastress, Application of a Constitutionally-BasedDuty of Fair Representation to Union HiringHalls,
82 W. VA. L. REV. 31, 47-48 (1979); Fenton, supra note 7, at 344-45; Fenton, Union Hiring Halls
Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 9 LAB. L.J. 505, 507 (1958); Rains, supra note 6, at 366-68; Ross, Origin
of the HiringHall in Construction, 11 INDUS. REL. 366 (1972); Sherman, Legal Status of the Building and Construction Trades Unions in the Hiring Process, 47 GEO. L.J. 203, 204-06 (1958).
The nature of the construction industry makes the hiring hall a virtual necessity:
A referral system is a quick and excellent source of qualified labor for a contractor
who needs to employ tradesmen. An exclusive referral system provides the contractor with
much greater access to a transient workforce.
Since tradesmen are employees of the industry rather than of single contractors, only
the records of the hiring hall can provide prospective employers with reliable work histories. By referring to the employment records maintained by the referral system, contractors are able to request applicants possessing specific or unique skills. This reduces the cost
incurred by contractors having to train or requalify tradesmen.
BUILDING & CONSTRUCTION TRADES DEP'T, AFL-CIO NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYERS
COUNCIL, MARKET RECOVERY PROGRAM HANDBOOK FOR UNION CONSTRUCTION 9 (1984).
The necessity for a hiring hall mechanism in the construction industry is such that the Associated General Contractors ("AGC"), an association whose membership includes nonunion construction companies, has published a booklet advising its nonunion members how to establish and
administer a worker registry system to fulfill the recruitment and referral function performed by
union hiring halls. ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA, PUB. No. 712, AGC
MODEL CONSTRUCTION WORKER REGISTRY SYSTEM (1986).
9. Other industries rely on the hiring hall as well. Hiring halls are used in the restaurant
industry for, among other things, referring workers to positions as "extras." Extras are workers
called in for special events held at restaurants and clubs, such as parties, private dinners, and receptions, as distinguished from a regular waiter who is steadily employed by a particular restaurant. See
Birmingham Country Club, 199 N.L.R.B. 854 (1972); Local 568, Hotel Employees Union (Warwick
Hotel), 141 N.L.R.B. 310 (1963), enforced, 334 F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1964). In the trucking industry, an
employer may need a varying number of drivers depending upon the requirements of the transportation contracts to which it has agreed. The hiring hall is a source providing qualified drivers as
needed. See Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961); General Truck
Drivers Local 980 (Neilson Freight Lines), 249 N.L.R.B. 46 (1980). Employer need for immediate
access to skilled workers in the publishing business is also satisfied by the union hiring hall. See
Martin v. Flannery, Civ. No. 84-7606 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 10, 1985); New York Lithographers
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operated hiring hall functions as a central employment clearinghouse.
Employers contact the local hiring hall and request the specific number
of workers required for the job; employees available for work register at
the hall and are dispatched to the jobs as needed. Thus the employer,
frequently based elsewhere, is assured of a readily available supply of
qualified workers, without the expense involved in a continual hiring process which would otherwise be required, while individual employees are
spared the time-consuming and often futile efforts at tracking down prospective employers at dispersed locations at a time when their services
are required.10

As of 1979, there were approximately 2,779 local unions throughout
the United States which operated hiring halls, having a total membership
of 2,227,736.11 Of these locals, 2,274 were involved2 in the building trades
industry, covering a total of 1,465,198 members.1
There are a variety of ways in which a union and an employer seeking to utilize a hiring hall can formalize their arrangement. The employer and union may be parties to a written agreement embodying the
terms of the hiring arrangement; 1 3 an explicit oral agreement may exist
Union No. 1-P (Publishers Ass'n), 258 N.L.R.B. 1043, 1044-45 (1981); Delaware Valley Printing
Union, Local 1776 (The Bulletin Co.), 226 N.L.R.B. 476, 481 (1976). Employment needs also fluctuate greatly in the entertainment business based on the type and duration of the performance involved. Accordingly, hiring hall arrangements are common in that industry as well. See IATSE,
Local 646 (Parker Playhouse), 270 N.L.R.B. 1425 (1984); IATSE, Local 592 (Saratoga Performing
Arts Center), 266 N.L.R.B. 703, 704 (1983); IATSE, Local No. 7 (Universal City Studios), 254
N.L.R.B. 1139 (1981). Indeed, employment agencies such as Kelly Services Inc. serve this same
type of need by providing employers immediate access to secretarial help for temporary, short-term
jobs.
10. It was to eliminate wasteful, time-consuming, and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual workmen and haphazard uneconomical searches by employers that the union hiring
hall as an institution came into being. It has operated as a crossroads where the pool of
employees converges in search of employment and the various employers' needs meet that
confluence of job applicants.
Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 n.8 (1957),
enforcement denied, 270 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1959).
11. These data have been aggregated from the 1979 Local Union Report EEO-3 data by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), Survey Division, Office of Program Research. The figures given are approximations only, as unions with fewer than 100 members are not
required to make a filing.
The EEO-3 form is required to be filed on an annual basis by all labor organizations with 100 or
more members. Those unions which operate a hiring hall or have a referral arrangement with employers must identify themselves as referral unions on this form and are required to provide a statistical breakdown of membership in referral units, and referrals and applicants by race, ethnic
background and sex. A referral unit is that portion of a labor organization's total membership that
has access to, and is employed pursuant to, a referral arrangement. For example, a Teamster local
might represent a bargaining unit of production workers as well as a unit of truck drivers, but only
the latter unit would be subject to the referral agreement.
12. Id.
13. See Local 825, IUOE (Bldg. Contractors Ass'n), 272 N.L.R.B. 186, 190 (1984); United
Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 522 (Caudle-Hyatt), 269 N.L.R.B. 574, 575 (1984); International Bhd. of
Boilermakers, Local 433 (Riley Stoker Corp.), 266 N.L.R.B. 596, 596-97 (1983). For other examples

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:339

between the parties; 4 or the parties' course of conduct may tacitly establish such an arrangement.' 5 Moreover, the arrangement between a union
and employer concerning use of the hiring hall may be either exclusive or
nonexclusive. An exclusive hiring arrangement requires the employer to
consider and hire only those applicants referred by the union hiring hall;
it is forbidden to accept applicants obtained from any other source, including walk-ins. 6 In a nonexclusive arrangement, an employer merely
utilizes the hiring hall as one source among many for obtaining applicants and hiring employees. 7
The methods by which a prospective employee is dispatched from a
union hiring hall also vary greatly. The system is controlled by a dispatcher who is generally a union official. Many hiring halls use a "first
in, first out," or rotary, system of job referrals. An employee who is out
of work signs her name at the bottom of an out-of-work list. As job
openings occur, the dispatcher refers the workers in the order in which
they have signed the list, starting with the individual at the top.' 8 Generally, the dispatcher contacts the workers on the list by phone; if unable to
reach a certain individual, the dispatcher goes to the next name on the
list.
of model contract clauses see 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS
(BNA) 55:31 (1985).
14. See, e.g., Local 213, Laborers, 223 N.L.R.B. 561, 564 (1976); International Ass'n of Ironworkers, Local 10 (Guy F. Atkinson Co.), 196 N.L.R.B. 712, 712 n.3 (1972), enforced, 83 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2409 (8th Cir. 1973); Lake County, Ind., Carpenters, 182 N.L.R.B. 233, 239-40 (1970), enforced, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2414 (7th Cir. 1972); Hoisting Eng'rs, Local 302 (West Coast Steel
Works), 144 N.L.R.B. 1449, 1452 (1963).
15. See, e.g., Local 394, Laborers (Bldg. Contractors Ass'n), 247 N.L.R.B. 97, 99-101 (1980),
enforced, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2175 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Castleman and Bates, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B.
477, 482 (1972), enforced, 87 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3274 (1st Cir. 1974); Local No. 245, Lithographers
(Alden Press, Inc.), 196 N.L.R.B. 720, 720-21 (1972), enforced, 481 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1973);
Hoisting Eng'rs, 144 N.L.R.B. at 1452.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EXCLUSIVE UNION WORK REFERRAL SYSTEMS IN THE BUILDING
TRADES 6 (1970). Even in an exclusive arrangement, however, an employer can retain the right to
reject applicants dispatched by the union. An employer is not obligated to hire every individual sent
from the hall; it is merely obligated not to seek or hire applicants from any other source. An employer may also retain the right to seek and employ applicants from alternate sources when the
union hiring hall is unable to meet the employer's labor needs within a specified time periodusually 24 or 48 hours-without affecting the exclusive nature of the arrangement. Finally, employers can retain the right to request by name certain employees from the hall without regard to their
placement on the list, and to directly hire a limited number of key personnel, and still be parties to
an exclusive agreement. Id.; see also Local 136, Muskingum Valley Dist. Council of the United Bhd.
of Carpenters, 165 N.L.R.B. 1040, 1041 (1967), enforcement denied on othergrounds, 404 F.2d 854
(6th Cir. 1968).
17. Hoisting Eng'rs, Local 4 (The Carlson Corp.), 189 N.L.R.B. 366 (1971), enforced, 456
F.2d 242 (1st Cir. 1972); Ohio Carpenters' Dist. Council (McGraw Constr. Co.), 131 N.L.R.B. 854
(1961).
18. See, e.g., Painters, Local 1178 (Roland Painting, Inc.), 265 N.L.R.B. 1341, 1342 (1982);
IUOE, Local 406 (Ford, Bacon & Davis Constr. Corp.), 262 N.L.R.B. 50, 50 n.2 (1982), enforced,
701 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1983); Sheet Metal Workers, Local 20 (The Employers Ass'n of Sheet Metal
Workers), 253 N.L.R.B. 166, 167 (1980); Bastress, supra note 8, at 48-49.
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Some hiring halls utilize multiple out-of-work lists, restricting access
to particular lists based on such factors as experience, level of training, or
other objective nondiscriminatory criteria.' 9 For example, a hall may
maintain three lists-an A, B, and C list. Individuals would be eligible to
sign the A list if they had attained journeyman status and had worked in
the industry at least 2,500 hours in the past three years; workers would
be eligible to sign the B list if they had attained apprentice status and had
worked in the industry at least 1,200 hours in the past three years; all
other applicants would be placed on the C list. Thereafter, as job openings occur, the dispatcher would refer all employees listed on the A list
on a rotary basis before sending any employees from the B20list, and then
exhaust the B list before making referrals from the C list.
Some unions keep no list at all, but simply give referrals to those
individuals present at the hall at the time the request for workers is
received. 2 '
While the above description suggests rather well-defined referral operations, in practice the system is not so orderly. It should be noted that
the phrase "hiring hall" is a term of art not necessarily implying the
existence of an actual hall. While many unions do maintain a location
expressly used for operating a referral system, some union hiring halls
are operated from the dispatcher's home 22 or from an office within the
union's business office. And while the concept of signing an out-of-work
list suggests that the applicant himself signs the list, many unions permit
oral notification of availability by the applicant to the dispatcher, who
then places the name on the list. Moreover, an out-of-work list might
not even exist. Some dispatchers attempt to keep "in their heads" the
information concerning who is available for work and their respective
priority rankings. 23 There are often no records kept to indicate what job
19. See, e.g., IBEW, Local 1I (L.A. County Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n), 270
N.L.R.B. 424, 424-25 (1984), enforced, 120 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2647 (9th Cir. 1985); ILA, Local 307
(West Gulf Maritime Ass'n), 257 N.L.R.B. 880, 883-84 (1981); Sachs Elec. Co., 248 N.L.R.B. 669,
669 n.3 (1980), enforced in part, 668 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1982); Bastress, supra note 8, at 49.
So long as the bases on which referral priorities are granted are objective and nondiscriminatory
within the meaning of the NLRA, see infra text accompanying notes 55-60, they are valid. See 2 C.
MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1398-99 (2d ed. 1983); Bailey, Construction Union Hiring
Halls: Service Under a Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Prerequisiteto High Priority Referral,
19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 203, 212-13 (1977).
20. See, e.g., United Ass'n of Plumbers, Local 619 (Bechtel Power Corp.), 268 N.L.R.B. 766
(1984).
21. See, e.g., IUOE, Local 406 v. NLRB, 701 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1983); Polis Wallcovering Co.,
262 N.L.R.B. 1336, 1338 (1982), enforced in part, 717 F.2d 805 (3d Cir. 1983); Bastress, supra note
8, at 49.
22. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, Local 350 (Atl. County Bldg. Trades
Employers Ass'n), 164 N.L.R.B. 644, 645 (1967).
23. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 328 (Blount Bros.), 274 N.L.R.B. 1053,
1055 (1985); Plumbers (Bechtel), 268 N.L.R.B. at 766; Polls, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1338; Local 394, Laborers, 247 N.L.R.B. at 101.
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openings were available with what employers and which applicants were
referred by the hall.24 Finally, many unions do not put in writing the
criteria used for ranking applicants for referral; thus there are no guidelines readily available to applicants for determining referral rules and
priorities.2 5
In comparing the theoretical description of hiring halls with the reality of their operation, it is apparent that the system is open to abuse by
dispatchers who would manipulate job opportunities for their own
purposes.
II
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ABUSE

The operation of a hiring hall is very difficult to police. The day-today operation of the system is normally controlled solely by the dispatcher, who is generally a union official. The almost total lack of documentation in many instances renders problematic any audit of the
referrals actually made. Even where records are kept, there is generally
no procedure for insuring that the records are complete or accurate. Accordingly, opportunities abound for "backdooring" jobs, bypassing applicants on the list, and discriminatorily matching applicants with jobs.26
Backdooring occurs when the dispatcher completely circumvents
the normal referral procedure. When a request for workers is received,
the dispatcher sets aside one or more of the jobs for friends who are
either not on the referral list at all or are too far down the list to be
eligible. If a record of referral requests is kept, the dispatcher will merely
neglect to make note of the request. The dispatcher contacts her friends
and refers them to the jobs.27
Bypassing is the practice of skipping over the first eligible workers
24. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 23.
25. See, e.g., IATSE, Local 646, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1425; Journeymen Pipe Fitters, Local 392
(Kaiser Eng'rs, Inc.), 252 N.L.R.B. 417, 420-21 (1980), enforcement denied, 712 F.2d 225 (6th Cir.
1983).
26. In discussing the issue of job manipulation, the author in no way intends to imply that all
hiring halls are plagued by these problems. Indeed, within some local unions, strict referral recordkeeping, sometimes including the use of computers, is the rule, virtually eliminating the possibility of
abuse. See C. LARROWE, supra note 7, at 139-53, for a description of a referral system operated by
the ILWU in Seattle. There is no evidence to suggest that unions always, or even usually, abuse
referral systems, even when opportunities for abuse exist. There is sufficient indication however,
based on case law alone, that some unions and their officers do abuse the system, and the problems
resulting from this abuse must be recognized and confronted.
27. See, e.g., IUOE, Local 450 (Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors), 267 N.L.R.B.
775, 779 n.6 & 795 n.88 (1983), enforced, 600 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1979); International Ass'n of Bridge
Workers, Local 433 (RPM Erectors, Inc.), 266 N.L.R.B. 154, 160-61 (1983), enforced, 600 F.2d 770
(9th Cir. 1979); International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, Local 433 (Assoc. Gen. Contractors), 228
N.L.R.B. 1420, 1424-36 (1977).
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for the job and dispatching an individual further down the list.2 8 Where
no priority ranking records are kept, bypassing is easy to accomplish and
difficult to challenge. Even where lists are kept, a dispatcher can claim
that he attempted to contact the first person on the list but was unsuccessful, and therefore gave the referral to the next individual.2 9 Or, in
those hiring hall arrangements where "by name" requests are permitted,3" a dispatcher may state that the employer requested the individual
further down the list by name, thereby authorizing a referral out of
order.3 1
Often, on any given day, more than one employer will contact the
hiring hall requesting workers for jobs of differing duration. In distributing these jobs, a dispatcher can discriminatorily match jobs by referring
his friends to the longer term jobs while sending other applicants to the
shorter jobs.3 2
28. See, e.g., Laborers, Local 135 (Bechtel Power Corp.), 271 N.L.R.B. 777, 792-96 (1984).
29. See, e.g., Murphy v. Local 18, IUOE, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2074, 2103 (N.D. Ohio 1978),
aff'd in pertinentpart, 774 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1985); Laborer's Local 215 (Research Cottrell, Inc.),
260 N.L.R.B. 688, 689-90 (1982).
30. See supra note 16.
31. See, e.g., Bridge Workers, Local 433, 228 N.L.R.B. at 1432-37.
32. See, e.g., IUOE, Local 450, 267 N.L.R.B. at 803; Local 394, Laborers, 247 N.L.R.B. at 11416, 129.
To understand the impact of these types of abuses on the employment opportunities of individual workers, it is helpful to consider the collective bargaining structure of the construction industry.
The construction industry is singled out because 81.8% of all referral unions are in the building
trades. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. Each group of contractors within an identifiable
segment of the construction industry is organized into separate employer trade associations. There
are 17 major national employer associations in the construction industry. Although not all contractors are members of an employer association, a great many are. See Mills, Construction, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 64-65 (G. Somers ed. 1980).
Most collective bargaining agreements in construction are negotiated on a local level between
local craft unions and employer associations. Id. at 64; OFFICE OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
SERVICES, LMSA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY REPORT 13 (1980).

Thus, an agreement will apply to a certain type of work (e.g., electrical work) within the local
union's geographical jurisdiction when performed for any employer who is a member of that particular trade association (e.g., National Electrical Contractors Association). An agreement containing
an exclusive hiring hall provision would bar any workers from employment with any employermember of the association unless referred by the union. Thus, the union effectively controls employment opportunities not just with one employer, but with the majority of employers performing that
type of work.
In a study of clauses contained in construction agreements in effect as of January 1, 1973, the
Department of Labor found that 53.5% of the agreements provided for exclusive hiring hall arrangements with a union. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1864,
CONTRACT CLAUSES IN CONSTRUCTION AGREEMENTS at v, 12-14 (1975). The Department of Labor chose 769 agreements for study, covering approximately 34% of all construction workers involved in standard construction crafts. Of these agreements, 64% (492) provided for union referral
arrangements: 53.5% (412) were exclusive arrangements and 10.5% (80) were nonexclusive. Thus,
unlike the usual job seeker who, if turned away by one employer, can apply to a second employer
and be assured of a de novo consideration of her application, individuals who must utilize the hiring
hall for work referrals do not get a second chance. The majority of employment opportunities in
their line of work within a defined geographical area are controlled by one source-the union hiring
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Even if the referral agreement between the union and employer is
nonexclusive, the job seeker is at a disadvantage if she is refused referral
by the hall. In the construction industry, 3 it is extremely difficult for an
applicant to locate the widespread and often remote job sites efficiently
and in a timely manner (i.e., when her particular skill is needed) without
the help of the centralized employment information service which a
nonexclusive hiring hall provides.
Because of the unique relationship between a hiring hall dispatcher
and applicants for referral, possibilities of abusing the system to the detriment of individual applicants are present. 34 Unlike the "stranger" employer whose information on an applicant is generally limited to work
related matters, 35 a hiring hall dispatcher will usually possess more personal knowledge about an applicant. Initially, he will know if the applicant is a union member,3 6 and if she is, whether she is a member of the
dispatcher's local union or a sister local. 37 When the applicant is a member of the dispatcher's own local, he will have a general idea about the
type of union political activities in which the applicant engages. The dispatcher may also be subject to pressure or influence from other union
officers who request him to give preference to, or punish, certain union
members. The possession of this type of information makes it possible
for a dispatcher to be influenced in making referrals by factors other than
relevant, work related issues.
Where a dispatcher allows his knowledge about an applicant's intraunion activities to influence his referral practices, the effect reaches beyond the individual applicant and sends a message throughout the entire
local union. Like the employer who discharges the union organizer in
order to quell incipient unionism among its workforce, the dispatcherunion official who manipulates the referral system to reward political alhall. If a worker is refused a referral by the hall, she does not have an alternative opportunity for
obtaining employment.
33. See supra notes 6 & 8 and accompanying text.
34. Although no studies exist documenting the incidence of hiring hall abuse, the number of
meritorious litigated cases on the phenomenon attests to its existence. See infra note 39.
35. See supra text accompanying note 5.
36. This information is available to the dispatcher because as a union officer he is likely to
know members personally. Since unions which operate exclusive halls are allowed to charge a user's
fee to nonmember applicants, the dispatcher will also know who is not a union member. Hotel
Employees Union, Local 355 (DuPont Plaza Hotel), 275 N.L.R.B. No. 168, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1271 (1985); C.B. Display Serv. Inc., 260 N.L.R.B. 1102, 1107-08 (1982); Local 7, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge Workers (Waghorne-Brown Co.), 144 N.L.R.B. 925, 927-28 (1963); C. MORRIS, supra note
19, at 1402; R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 668-69 (1976). If a hiring hall is nonexclusive, a union is permitted to deny nonmembers
access to the hall's services. Teamsters, Local 327 (Breeko Indus.), 167 N.L.R.B. 998 (1967). Thus,
at the time an individual presents herself to register at the hall for work, the dispatcher can ask to see
her union card.
37. See supra note 36. In checking the applicant's union card, the dispatcher will be able to tell
of what local the individual is a member.
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lies and punish political enemies can suppress internal union criticism
and dissent among the membership as a whole.38
Litigated cases are replete with examples of union officials abusing
their authority over referrals from the hiring hall for the purpose of eliminating rival political factions and consolidating their own control over
the union.39 In subtle and not so subtle ways the incumbent officers who
control the referral process let their influence be felt among the membership. Sometimes the political rival discovers that her referral hours have
dropped significantly since she undertook to challenge the incumbent
leadership.' Often, the dissident will be directly confronted with the
fact that she will not receive any work referrals as long as she stirs up
trouble.4" Occasionally, loathe to wait for the grapevine to carry the
news, the union officer-dispatcher announces to the membership that
38. While abusing the system to the disadvantage of nonunion applicants or sister union applicants works a hardship on the individuals discriminated against, this type of abuse often does not
have the same widespread chilling effect that political abuse of the system creates. Discrimination
based on nonunion and sister union status is, however, illegal when the hiring hall system is exclusive. See, e.g., United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, Local 198 (Jacobs/Wiese), 268 N.L.R.B.
1312 (1984), enforced, 747 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1984); International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, Local
480 (Bldg. Contractors Ass'n), 235 N.L.R.B. 1511 (1978), enforced, 103 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2603 (3d
Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 100 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 10,974 (U.S. 1984). The
nature and effect of discrimination based on nonunion or sister union status is beyond the scope of
this Article.
39. See, e.g., NLRB v. Laborers Local 300, 613 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Hoisting
Eng'rs Local 4, 456 F.2d 242 (1st Cir. 1972); NMU v. NLRB, 423 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1970); NLRB v.
Local 138, IUOE, 293 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1961); IUOE Local 478 (Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp.),
274 N.L.R.B. 567 (1985); General Truck Drivers, Local 5 (Leonard B. Herbert, Jr. & Co.), 272
N.L.R.B. 1375 (1984); Local 553, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers (Plumbing, Heating, Piping and Air Conditioning Contractors Ass'n), 271 N.L.R.B. 1361 (1984); Laborers Local 135 (Bechtel Power Corp.), 271 N.L.R.B. 777 (1984); Carpenters Union, Local 25 (Mocon Corp.), 270
N.L.R.B. 623 (1984), enforced, 769 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1985); Ohio Valley Carpenters' Dist. Council
(Catalytic, Inc.), 267 N.L.R.B. 1223 (1983); Frank Mascali Constr., 251 N.L.R.B. 219 (1980), enforced, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2423 (2d Cir. 1982); Pipeline Local 38 (Hancock-Northwest), 247
N.L.R.B. 1250 (1980), enforced as modified, 748 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Local 808, United Bhd.
of Carpenters (Bldg. Contractors Ass'n), 238 N.L.R.B. 735 (1978); Local 174, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters (Totem Beverage, Inc.), 226 N.L.R.B. 690 (1976); United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, Local 137 (Hames Constr. & Equip. Co.), 207 N.L.R.B. 359 (1973); IUOE, Local 18 (C.F. Braun Co.),
205 N.L.R.B. 901 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1974); Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
(Rubber City Express), 204 N.L.R.B. 700 (1973), enforced, 506 F.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Local
1098, United Bhd. of Carpenters (Chauncey Constr. Co.), 186 N.L.R.B. 385 (1970); United Bhd. of
Carpenters, Local 1281 (Raber-Kief, Inc.), 152 N.L.R.B. 629 (1965), enforced, 369 F.2d 684 (9th
Cir. 1966); J.J. Hagerty, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 633 (1962), enforced in part, 321 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1963).
40. See, e.g., Local 394, Laborers, 247 N.L.R.B. at 113-16, 124-27; Oversight Hearings, supra
note 1, at 356-60.
41. See, e.g., Laborers Local 300, 613 F.2d at 205 (When dissident asked business agent when
he would be referred for work, the response was: "Stop fighting me and you can go to work."); J.J.
Hagerty, 139 N.L.R.B. at 654 (When member of reform group asked union president about job
referrals he was told, "If you all sit back and shut up, everything will go all right; you will have no
trouble finding work. Otherwise, we'll keep you out of work as long as we want.").
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"troublemakers" will not get jobs.42
Thus, the impact of the political abuse of the hiring hall system is
felt both by the individual worker discriminated against4 3 and by the
membership of the union as a whole. Other members of the union, having learned the lesson taught by the punishment meted out to individual
dissidents, would have to be courageous indeed, and perhaps foolhardy,
to risk their prospects for employment by challenging the union leadership. The effect of the membership's abdication of its role in governing
the union is to undermine the legitimacy of the union as a representative
of the workers' interests, to the detriment of both the membership and
the union itself.'
III
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE

NLRA

A. Statutory Doctrines
As originally passed in 1935, the Wagner Act's prohibitions were
42. See, e.g., Local 1098, Carpenters, 186 N.L.R.B. at 387 (Business agent told union member,
"People that vote for me and support me in this next election are the people that are going to work
for the next two years."); IUQE. Local 18, 205 N.L.R.B. at 905 (union officer announcement at
union meeting prior to election that "he was going to use the referral system to starve [the opposition] out of the organization").
43. The discrimination has the direct effect of interfering with the individual's employment
opportunities, thereby causing loss of earnings and related fringe benefits such as medical and life
insurance coverage and pension benefit accrual. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 1, at 356-63.
44. An underlying principle of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
("LMRDA") was the belief that guaranteeing minimum democratic safeguards within unions and
requiring detailed information about the union would enable members to regulate the unions and
prevent the corruption, racketeering and abuse uncovered by the McClellan Committee hearings. S.
REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7 (1959). The Supreme Court has also acknowledged the
importance of protecting the union members' rights to "participate fully in the operation of their
union through processes of democratic self-government." Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Union, Local 6,
391 U.S. 492, 497 (1968). Whenever those democratic processes are impeded, the union's ability to
respond to the control of the membership is undermined.
If a reason for the existence of unions is not merely to provide a monopoly on labor's side to
match that of the employer, but also to provide an active voice for workers in the workplace, as
suggested by Richard Freeman and James Medoff in their book WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984), this
latter function cannot be accomplished in the absence of internal union democracy. See Cox, The
Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 609-12 (1959).
The effect of the suppression of democracy within a union spreads beyond the membership and
the institution itself to the general public. Because of the role played by unions in the collective
bargaining process, they are in a position to establish wage rates and employment standards which
affect the regulation of the labor market as a whole. See Summers, Internal Relations Between Unions and Their Members: General Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 236, 237-39 (1964). Unions also
exercise political power in their position as voices of organized labor, as well as economic power in
their use of the strike. This impact was recognized by Congress in passing the LMRDA. It "emphatically asserted a vital public interest in assuring free and democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of the complaining union member." Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463, 475 (1968).
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aimed solely at management, 45 and the closed shop4 6 was legal. The
Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 added union unfair labor practices to
the statute4 7 and outlawed the closed shop.4 8 For the first time the issue
of the legality of union hiring halls was addressed. There was considerable debate over whether Taft-Hartley barred all union hiring hall arrangements or only those which discriminated against nonmembers.4 9
The controversy was eventually, if not finally, settled by the National
Labor Relations Board ("Board" or "NLRB"), in the Mountain Pacific
case.5" The Board held that while Taft-Hartley did not prohibit union
hiring halls, an exclusive hiring hall arrangement 5 vesting unfettered
control over hiring with the union had the inherent effect of encouraging
membership in a labor organization in violation of section 8(b)(2), 5 2 even
in the absence of specific evidence of discriminatory application of the
system. The Board held that this unlawful effect could be negated by
explicitly providing in the hiring hall agreement that: (1) selection of
applicants for referral would be nondiscriminatory and unaffected by
union membership status; (2) the employer would retain the right to reject any applicant; and (3) the parties must prominently post provisions
explaining the functioning of the hiring hall. 3 Of course, actual operation of a hiring hall referral system in a discriminatory manner (i.e.,
granting preference to members over nonmembers), constituted a viola45. Pub. L. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (only employers could commit unfair labor
practices).
46. A closed shop requires that a worker be a member of a union before she can be hired by an
employer. T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 4 (1977).
47. See C. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 35-48.
48. T. HAGGARD, supra note 46, at 34. The proviso to § 8(a)(3) did, however, allow for union
security agreements in the form of a union shop. An employer and union may agree to require that
all employees must become, and remain, members of the union on or after 30 days following the
beginning of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982). The extent of required membership is
limited to the payment of uniform initiation fees and dues exacted of full-fledged union members.
Employees cannot be required to actually join the organization. NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
373 U.S. 734 (1963); Local 1104, CWA v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1051 (1976); Union Starch & Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951); T. HAGGARD, supra note 46, at 39-70; Cantor, Uses and
Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61-62 & n.2 (1983).
49. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra note 16, at 7-20; Fenton, supra note 7, at 346-51; Sherman, supra note 8, at 206-08; Note, Labor Law-Maritime Hiring Halls Fall Afoul of Taft-Hartley
Closed Shop Ban, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 82 (1948).
50. Mountain Pac. Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957).
51. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1982) states, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to cause or attempt
to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection
(a)(3). ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982) states, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. ...
53. Mountain Pac., 119 N.L.R.B. at 894-97.
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tion of section 8(b)(2)." 4
While the Supreme Court agreed that Congress had not outlawed
the hiring hall, it held that the Board did not have the power to infer the
existence of discrimination from the mere existence of an exclusive hiring
hall arrangement.5" Acknowledging that the existence of such an exclusive arrangement may indeed be said to encourage union membership,
only encouragement "which is accomplished by discrimination" is prohibited by section 8(b)(2). The Court held that the Board lacked the
authority to require the parties to specifically include the three Mountain
Pacific standards before an exclusive hiring hall agreement would be
legal. Therefore, to establish a violation of section 8(b)(2), the hiring hall
agreement must be discriminatory on its face or there must be evidence
of discriminatory application of a facially neutral system.56
Section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA does not prohibit all discriminatory
conduct by a labor organization, but only that which encourages or discourages union membership. In the context of the NLRA, the concept
of membership does not necessarily equate with signing a membership
card and joining the organization. The concept encompasses various degrees of organizational adherence, according to individual preference.
As the Supreme Court stated in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB :
The policy of the Act is to insulate employees' jobs from their organizational rights. Thus . . . 8(b)(2) [was] designed to allow employees to

freely exercise their right to join unions, be good, bad or indifferent members, or abstain from joining any union without imperiling their
livelihood.5 8
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA also prohibits unions from restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.5 9
54. See. e.g., id. at 887-89 (Murdock, Mbr., dissenting in part); ILWU, Local 10 (True Knowledge), 102 N.L.R.B. 907 (1953), enforced, 214 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 908
(1954); International Bhd. of Boilermakers, Local 6 (Ross E. Dulinsky Consol. W. Steel Corp.), 94
N.L.R.B. 1590 (1951).
For a more detailed discussion of Mountain Pac. and its ramifications, see Fenton, supra note 7,
at 358-65; Rothman, The Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining to Hiring Hall
Agreements, 48 VA. L. REV. 871, 872-74 (1962); Sherman, supra note 8, at 209-23; Comment, Unqualified Hiring Hall Contract Constitutes Per Se Discrimination, 11 STAN. L. REV. 181 (1958).
55. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673-75 (1961).
56. Id. at 675-76. For a more detailed discussion of Local 357, see Rothman, supra note 54, at
874-82; Note, DiscriminatoryPractices in Exclusive Hiring Halls, 16 Sw. L.J. 147 (1962); Note,
Hiring Hall Agreement Not Containing NLRB "Safeguards" Not Per Se Violative of NLRA, 46
MINN. L. REV. 430 (1961).

57. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
58. Id. at 40.
59. NLRA § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1982), states, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7....
NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982), states, in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
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Employee activities which involve internal union politics, for example,
campaigning against incumbent leadership in intraunion elections, criticizing union officials, and protesting union decisions or activities, are
clearly within the scope of section 7.'
Thus, the NLRA specifically protects union members from discrimination or coercion based on their intraunion political activities. As applied to the operation of union hiring halls, the NLRA prohibits the
consideration of union political activities in determining which applicants will be referred for jobs from the hall. This prohibition affects both
nonexclusive and exclusive arrangements.6 1
Where a hiring hall arrangement is nonexclusive, section 8(b)(2) is
not implicated. As the union is merely one source among many from
which an employer selects its workforce, and the employer does not afford any special consideration to those applicants referred by the union,
it would be difficult to show that the employer was affected by the
union's refusal to refer a specific individual. Therefore, it could not be
said that the union's action in any way "caused or attempted to cause"
the employer to discriminate.6 2
The proscription against restraint or coercion imposed by section
8(b)(1)(A) does apply to nonexclusive hiring halls. Having undertaken
to provide an employment related service for a group of employees whom
it represents, in this case union members, it cannot discriminate in providing this service among the represented group based on the exercise of
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
60. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 485, IUE, 454 F.2d 17, 21 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972); ILA, Local 333
(ITO Corp.), 267 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1983); New York City Taxi Drivers Union, Local 3036 (Taxi
Maintenance Corp.), 231 N.L.R.B. 965, 966-67 (1977); Hoisting Eng'rs, 189 N.L.R.B. at 374; Chauffeur's Union Local 923 (Yellow Cab Co.), 172 N.L.R.B. 2137, 2138 (1968).
61. The discriminatory operation of a union hiring hall can result in a violation of either
§ 8(b)(1)(A) or both § 8(b)(1)(A) and § 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. See supra notes 52 & 59. As a general
rule, where the referral system is nonexclusive, only § 8(b)(1)(A) is involved; whereas an exclusive
referral system implicates both sections of the Act. See Local 121, Operative Plasterers (Assoc.
Bldg. Contractors), 264 N.L.R.B. 192, 195 (1982).
62. See Truck Drivers Local No. 705 (Assoc'd Transp., Inc.), 209 N.L.R.B. 292 (1974), enforced, 532 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1976):
An essential element of a violation of Section 8(b)(2) is that a union must have attempted
The
to cause what would be a violation of Section 8(a)(3) for an employer to do....
necessary causal connection between a union's attempt and an employer's act can be found
where an exclusive hiring agreement, arrangement, or practice, exists between a union and
an employer pursuant to which an applicant is frozen out of the hiring process through a
denial of the use of the hiring hall. Where, as here, a contract requires only that the
employer give the union an equal opportunity with other sources to provide it with job
applicants, an 8(b)(2) violation must be founded on something more than the contract,
since such a contract, by its terms, provides for a nonexclusive hiring hall.
Id. at 307 (citations omitted). See also Local 121, Operative Plasterers,264 N.L.R.B. at 195. But cf.
Hoisting Eng'rs, 189 N.L.R.B. at 366 n. I (Board reserves judgment on issue of whether discriminatory operation of a nonexclusive hiring hall can implicate § 8(b)(2)).
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section 7 rights.6 3 By assisting those union members whose politics the
union officer finds acceptable, but denying such assistance to those members perceived as dissidents, the dispatcher is sending a clear message to
all union members that their chances for future employment will be impaired if they do not toe the party line. The coercive impact of this
message on the members' willingness to actively engage in union politics
is not lessened by the fact that the coercive effect would be even greater
were the union to exclusively control access to employment and thus
have the ability to terminate, and not merely impair, employment
opportunities.' 4
Where the hiring hall arrangement is exclusive, the strictures of
both section 8(b)(1)(A) and section 8(b)(2) come into play. A refusal to
refer an individual because of his union political activity, when the union
constitutes the sole means of obtaining employment with the employer in
question, clearly coerces that individual in exercising his section 7 rights.
Since the union's refusal to refer the person is for reasons related to his
union membership, the employer's subsequent failure to consider him for
employment is also essentially related to his union membership status.
Thus the union's conduct represents an attempt to cause the employer to
discriminate against the individual, in violation of section 8(b)(2). 6 5
The NLRA deals with the problem of the political abuse of a union
hiring hall system.6 6 It is the main avenue of attack used by litigants who
have been subjected to discrimination in referrals because of their union
political views. But because of the basic policy and principles underlying
the NLRA, there are certain inherent limitations in using that statute to
deal with manipulation of the hiring process for the purpose of suppressing union democracy.
A basic purpose of the NLRA is to equalize employee bargaining
power with that of the employer for the purpose of promoting collective
bargaining.6 7 The vehicle for equalization is the union-the collective
63. See, e.g., Local 121, Operative Plasterers, 264 N.L.R.B. at 195; Hoisting Eng'rs, 189
N.L.R.B. at 366-67; Chauffeur's Union Local 923, 172 N.L.R.B. at 2138.
64. See Crouse Nuclear Energy Servs., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 390, 390 n.2 (1979) and cases cited
therein.
65. See, e.g., IUOE, Local 18, 205 N.L.R.B. at 910; Local 1098, Carpenters, 186 N.L.R.B. at
390; Local 136, Carpenters, 165 N.L.R.B. at 1042; Carpenters,Local 1281, 152 N.L.R.B. at 634-35.
See also Annotation, Union's Discriminatory Operation of Exclusive Hiring Hall as Unfair Labor
Practice Under § 8(b) of the NLRA, 73 A.L.R. FED. 171, 192-94 (1985) and cases cited therein.
66. Besides the theories already discussed, discriminating against a union member based on his
union political conduct can also violate the union's duty of fair representation. Breach of the duty of
fair representation is encompassed within the prohibitions of § 8(b)(1)(A). Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 177-78 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172
(2d Cir. 1963). For a thorough discussion of the application of the duty of fair representation to the
operation of union hiring halls, see generally Bastress, supra note 8.
67. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1935); Cox, Some
Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1947).
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strength of the employees banded together in a union would match the
employer's strength. In order to assure the employees' ability to organize, it is necessary to safeguard them in their employment relationship
from discrimination based on their organizational activities. The concept
of protection based on intraunion activities evolved as a corollary of this
protection. But the focal point of the statute is not the member-union
relationship.68 The NLRA begins with the perspective of the employment relationship, and applies union exclusive representation in collective bargaining as the mechanism for insuring peace and stability in that
relationship. The statute therefore regulates the employer-union relationship within a wider perspective of the employment relationship.
Thus the methods for enforcing the protections of the NLRA and the
remedies available for violations reflect that focus.
B.

Enforcement Procedures Under the NLRA

Enforcement authority is vested solely with the General Counsel of
the NLRB.6 9 If the General Counsel determines not to issue a complaint
in a particular case, that decision is unreviewable by the Board or the
courts.7 °
The practical effect of this administrative scheme is that a party believing
himself the victim of an unfair labor practice can obtain neither adjudication nor remedy under the labor statute without first persuading the Office of the General Counsel that his claim is sufficiently meritorious to
warrant Board consideration. 7 '
When a complaint is issued, the scope and direction of the litigation
is largely controlled by the General Counsel. Although counsel for the
charging party is allowed to intervene, private counsel's role is limited.
Counsel has the right to present evidence, examine witnesses and make
arguments,72 but the General Counsel retains the authority to frame the
allegations of the complaint,7 3 which determines the issues to be decided
68. Indeed, during the debates over the Taft-Hartley amendment which, inter alia, added
union unfair labor practices to the NLRA, representatives considered including a section dealing
with internal union affairs. Section 8(c) of H.R. 3020 was aimed at ensuring that unions operate
democratically. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABORMANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 52-56, 322 (1948) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LMRA]. The final statute, however, included only a few provisions purporting to regulate union
government and otherwise abandoned any attempt to systematically regulate internal union affairs at
that time. Id. at 550; Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HARV. L. REV. 851 (1960).

69. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982).
70. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 138 (1975); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
at 182; Bays v. Miller, 524 F.2d 631, 634 (9th Cir. 1975). But see Rosenblum, A New Look at the
General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a Complaint Under the NLRA, 86 YALE L.J.
1349 (1977).
71. Sears, 421 U.S. at 139.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 102.38 (1984); IUE v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982); Sunbeam Plastics Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1011 n.1 (1963).
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by the administrative law judge at the hearing.74
The availability of pretrial discovery in proceedings under the
NLRA is severely limited. The normal discovery procedures provided
for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable to unfair
labor practice hearings.7 5 Provision for prehearing discovery is solely
within the NLRB's discretion,7 6 and is limited in nature.
The Board's rules and regulations provide for the taking of depositions, but they must be authorized by either the regional director, prior
to the opening of an unfair labor practice hearing, or the administrative
law judge thereafter.77 Granting an application for depositions is committed to the discretion of the regional director or administrative law
judge7 8 for good cause shown, which is generally limited to situations
involving unavailability of the witness for the hearing.7 9 While subpoenae, both ad testificandum and duces tecum, are available as a matter
of course in connection with unfair labor practice hearings, 80 they are
returnable on the date the hearing begins, and are not a mechanism for
pretrial discovery as they are under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 Moreover, trial subpoenae are not self-enforcing, but must be
enforced by a federal district court.8 2 The authority to petition the court
for enforcement resides exclusively with the NLRB.8 3 The court is with74.

See IUE v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Sunbeam Plastics, 144 N.L.R.B. at 1011

n.1.
75. See, e.g., NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971); North Am. Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961); Magic Pan,
Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 840 (1979); Lyman Printing & Finishing Co., 183 N.L.R.B. 1048 (1970), enforced, 437 F.2d 1356 (4th Cir. 1971); Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294
(1960), enforced, 291 F.2d 751 (8th Cir. 1961).
76. See supra cases cited in note 75. The problems caused by a lack of discovery, particularly
in a hiring hall case, are evident in this excerpt from the administrative law judge's decision in
Laborers' Local 282 (Millstone Constr.), 236 N.L.R.B. 621, 630 (1978):
Prior to the hearing, only the Union was in a position to know who was referred, who was
not, and why. Prior to the hearing, the Union refused to furnish General Counsel with a
copy of its alleged out-of-work list (although permitting a Field Examiner to look at the
list), and, as matters turned out, that list was a false or falsified one. Moreover, two major
employers declined to cooperate with the Regional Office's investigation.
77. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30(a) (1986).
78. Id.; Electromec Design and Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969); Trojan
Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1966).
79. Valley Mold Co., 215 N.L.R.B. 211, 213 (1974), enforced, 530 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1976).
80.

29 U.S.C. § 161(l) (1982); 29 C.F.R. § 102.31 (1986).

81. There is provision for the issuance, during the investigative stages of administrative proceedings, of subpoenae which are returnable prior to any hearing, but their availability is limited to
the General Counsel; they are not issued at the behest of private parties. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL
11770 (1983). But cf FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (provides for the use of subpoenae to require attendance of witnesses and production of documents at
pre-trial depositions).
82.

29 U.S.C. § 161(2) (1982).

83.

Id.
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out jurisdiction to enforce a subpoena upon motion of a private party. s4
Nor is the Board required to seek enforcement upon the request of a
private party, but only if enforcement would be consistent with the law
and policies of the Act.8"
The remedial authority of the Board is circumscribed by the dual
requirements that its orders must be designed to effectuate the policies of
the NLRA, but that they may not be punitive in nature. 6 As applied to
hiring hall cases, the policy to be effectuated is "to insulate employees'
jobs from their organizational rights, ' 87 not to preserve democracy
within the union institution. For this reason, available remedies, while
dealing with the denial of job opportunities, do not attempt to cure the
underlying cause of the problem: the suppression of the democratic
rights of union members.8 8
In cases where the political manipulation of the hiring system
manifests itself in backdooring or bypassing-i. e., where lawful, objective
criteria exist for determining referral priority but the dispatcher disregards the established procedure in dealing with dissidents-the Board
will order the union to cease and desist from discriminating in job referrals, to follow established referral criteria, to keep records of referral operations adequate to disclose the basis on which every referral is made,
and to make said records available for inspection by an agent of the
Board's regional office.89 Where the discrimination is accomplished by
virtue of the lack of any objective referral criteria, priority being determined solely by the dispatcher, the Board will order the union to cease
and desist from operating the hiring hall without any objective criteria
and require the union to develop such criteria for future operation. 90
The authority of the Board to compensate those individuals who
have been subjected to illegal political discrimination is limited by the
mandate that orders be remedial and not punitive in nature. 9 ' The pur84. NLRB v. Dutch Boy, Inc., 606 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979); Wilmot v. Doyle, 403 F.2d 811
(9th Cir. 1968).
85. 29 C.F.R. § 102.31(d) (1986); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL

11790.1 (1983).

86. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969); Local 60, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 651 (1961); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See J.HUNSIKER, J. KAVE, & P. WALTHER, NLRB REMEDIES
FOR UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (1986).
87. Radio Officers', 347 U.S. at 40.
88. Of course, to the extent that union members are made whole for discrimination suffered by
reason of their union political activities, they will be encouraged to continue their political activism
in the belief that any future attempts to retaliate will likewise be remedied.
89. See, e.g., Bridge Workers, Local 350, 164 N.L.R.B. at 651-52; Skouras Theaters Corp., 155
N.L.R.B. 157, 158 n.2 (1965), enforced, 361 F.2d 826 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 972
(1966); J.J. Hagerty, 139 N.L.R.B. at 633; C. MORRIS, supra note 19, at 1686.
90. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters, 274 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1061 (1985); IATSE, Local
646, 270 N.L.R.B. at 1425; Polis, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1344; Local 394, Laborers, 247 N.L.R.B. at 131.
91. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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pose of Board monetary awards, therefore, is to restore the discriminatee
to the economic position she would have held in the absence of discrimination.9 2 This make-whole remedy requires that the individual be
awarded an amount equal to the pay she would have earned from the
employment she would have held but for the discrimination. This
amount includes all forms of payment received as reimbursement for employment, such as bonuses, overtime and all fringe benefits such as health
and life insurance and pension accrual.9 3 The concept of make-whole is,
however, a narrow one, limited to those monetary losses directly attributable to the discrimination in question. It does not include collateral
losses or punitive damages, neither of which are recoverable under the
NLRA.

94

Moreover, the one individual most directly responsible for the discrimination suffered by the political dissident, the union officer-dispatcher who is using his power over the hiring hall to consolidate and
strengthen his position within the union, is not personally liable for the
monetary losses of the dissident.95 The money comes solely from the
union treasury, which itself is a victim of the dispatcher's political manipulations to the extent that suppression of democracy within the union
works to the detriment of the union as a whole.
Neither does the Board's policy normally provide for payment of the
92. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
93. See, e.g., The Richard W. Kaase Co., 162 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1967); W.C. Nabors, 134
N.L.R.B. 1078 (1961); F.W. Woolworth Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 289 (1950); NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL

10530-10546 (1983).

94. See NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951); ConsolidatedEdison, 305 U.S. at
235-36.
95. The Board's policy does not require the payment of backpay by an individual union agent.
Its usual practice is not to impose personal liability. See, e.g., Local 1098, Carpenters, 186 N.L.R.B.
at 390 n. 11; International Union of United Brewery Workers (Considine Distrib. Co.), 166 N.L.R.B.
915, 915 n.1 (1967); Local 136, Carpenters, 165 N.L.R.B. at 1042 n.5; Local 121, Marble Polishers,
132 N.L.R.B. 844, 845 n.2 (1961); Local 490, Int'l Hod Carriers, 130 N.L.R.B. 380, 381 n.2 (1961),
enforced, 300 F.2d 328 (8th Cir. 1962). The Board has not articulated a specific rationale for this
policy, although several have been proffered. Motion Picture Operators Union, Local 244, 126
N.L.R.B. 376, 377 n.3 (1960) (business agent not personally liable because he acted as agent of union
and not in individual capacity); Local 420, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, Ill N.L.R.B.
1126, 1127-28 (1955), enforced, 239 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1956) (personal liability not deemed necessary
to effectuate purposes of the NLRA); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 179, 110 N.L.R.B. 287,
288, 305-06 (1954) (The trial examiner interpreted the NLRA as prohibiting finding a union agent
personally liable because the business agent is a creature of the union and not a separate entity, and
because § 10(c) limits the imposition of backpay to either employers or labor organizations but does
not include agents. The trial examiner's recommendation on this issue was specifically adopted by
the Board even though no exceptions had been filed.).
In the one instance where a Board order imposed personal liability on a union business agent,
IUOE, Local 925, 180 N.L.R.B. 759 (1970), the court of appeals refused to enforce that aspect of the
order since the Board had departed from its normal policy of refusing to impose personal liability
without offering any reason for the change in policy. NLRB v. IUOE, Local 925, 460 F.2d 589, 60304 (5th Cir. 1972). The court noted the argument that the imposition of personal liability is contrary
to § 10(c) without deciding the issue. Id. at 604 n.9.
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charging party's attorney fees by the respondent. The political dissident
who successfully vindicates her right to nondiscriminatory referral treat96
ment must shoulder the expense of obtaining independent counsel.
Only in extraordinary cases, where the respondent's defenses are frivolous, has the Board ordered the respondent to reimburse the charging
party for expenses incurred in the investigation, preparation, and litigation of the case, including, inter alia, counsel fees. 97
Finally, any order eventually obtained from the Board is not selfenforcing.98 If a respondent refuses to comply voluntarily, the Board
must seek enforcement of its order in a federal circuit court of appeals. 99
It is only after obtaining enforcement that a subsequent refusal to comply
is punishable by contempt. Even where a respondent indicates a desire to
comply, lengthy backpay compliance proceedings are often necessary to
determine the amount of backpay due the discriminatee.' °° Thus, the
perceived advantages of utilizing the relatively expeditious procedures of
the NLRB are often illusory in practice.''
It can hardly be claimed that the NLRA has neither been enforced
in this area nor been effective in remedying the discrimination suffered by
political activists. Nonetheless, the Act's inherent limitations in dealing
with the underlying cause of the political abuse of hiring halls-the suppression of union democracy and corresponding abuse of the union
leader's power-suggest a need to consider an alternative approach.
96. Heck's, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 886, 889 (1971), rev'd in pertinentpart, 476 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir.
1973), remanded, 417 U.S. 1 (1973).
97. See, e.g., Federal Prescription Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 496 F.2d 813, 819 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); Amalgamated Local 355 v. NLRB, 481 F.2d 996, 1007 (2d Cir. 1973);
Union Nacional de Trabajadores (Jacobs Constrs. Co.), 219 N.L.R.B. 405, 412 (1975), enforced, 540
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1976); Tiidee Prods., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 1234, 1236-37 (1972), enforced in part, 502
F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
Of course, an advantage of utilizing the procedures of the NLRB is that independent counsel for
the charging party is not required. The General Counsel, in the public interest, prosecutes the case
on behalf of the charging party. Accord Heck's, 191 N.L.R.B. at 889.
98.

29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, NLRB CASE10506-10506.1 (1983).
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99. See supra note 98. See also NLRB v. Local 80, Sheet Metal Workers, 491 F.2d 1017 (6th
Cir. 1974).
100. See, e.g., NLRB v. Plumbers Local 403, 710 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1983); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, Local 433, 600 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915
(1980); Laborers Local 135, 271 N.L.R.B. at 781.
101. The median time elapsed from the filing of an unfair labor practice charge to the issuance
of a Board decision was 484 days in 1980 and 490 days in 1981, the most recent data published. 45
NLRB ANN. REP. 294 (1980); 46 NLRB ANN. REP. 228 (1981). The national median time from

filing the complete record in the federal courts of appeals to disposition was 8.9 months in 1980 and
9.3 months in 1981. These data refer to all cases filed in the courts of appeals; it is not limited to
NLRB filings. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 15 (1983). The total elapsed time, therefore, from the filing of a charge to a court-enforced
order is approximately two years.
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IV
AN

LMRDA

ALTERNATIVE

The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 10 2 specifically addresses the issues of the union-member relationship and internal
union democracy. Its passage was aimed at preserving democratic standards within unions to enable the members to maintain control over the
purposes and policies of their organization.'t 3 Thus, an objective of this
statute is to restrict union and union officer conduct intended to suppress
union democracy. Substantive as well as procedural aspects of the
LMRDA lend themselves to achieving that objective." °
Title I grants union members the substantive right to express any
views, arguments or opinions both during union meetings and at other
times,' °5 free from infringement 10 6 or discipline" °7 by the union or its
102. Pub. L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
For an excellent overview of the LMRDA, see J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUMGRIFFIN ACT: TWENTY YEARS OF FEDERAL PROTECTION OF UNION MEMBERS' RIGHTS (1979).

103. See Griffin, A New Era in Labor-ManagementRelations, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABORMANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 25 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961) ("The
third fundamental principle which should (and, as evidenced by the [LMRDA], now does) underlie
our national labor policy is that labor unions should exist for the benefit of, and be subject always to
the control of, the membership .... "). See also supra note 44. See generally Aaron, The LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal
Affairs of Labor Unions Under the LaborReform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 829-31 (1960);
Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199
(1960).
104. The scope of protection afforded by the LMRDA is therefore limited to members of the
specific union alleged to have violated the statute. Hughes v. Local 11, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 287 F.2d 810 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961); MacKenzie v. Local 624, IUOE, 472 F.
Supp. 1025, 1031 (N.D. Miss. 1979). Thus, where hiring hall discrimination impacts upon nonunion
workers or workers who belong to a different union than the one operating the hall, it is not cognizable under the LMRDA. Such discrimination may, however, be illegal under the NLRA. See supra
note 38.
105. LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1982), states:
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely
with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at
meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor
organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided,
That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt
and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
106. LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), states, in pertinent part:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed
by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United
States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate.
107. LMRDA § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1982), states:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other
representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or
otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled
under the provisions of this chapter. The provisions of section 412 shall be applicable in
the enforcement of this section.
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representatives. It also confers protection from union discipline in the
absence of certain procedural safeguards." 8 Title V imposes a fiduciary
responsibility upon union officers and representatives, requiring them to
exercise their authority for the benefit of the organization and its members.1 09 That responsibility is enforceable at the behest of a union member."1 ° The applicability of these provisions of the LMRDA to the
political abuse of hiring halls will be discussed seriatim, followed by a
consideration of litigation issues involved in enforcing these provisions.
A.

Applicability of Title I

1. Section 101(a)(2)
a. Substantive Rights
The guarantee of free speech to union members contained in section
101 (a)(2)"' specifically embraces the members' right to criticize, as well
as support, union policies and officials, and to actively campaign for, and
against, candidates for union office:
108. LMRDA § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1982), states:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise
disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof
unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
109. LMRDA § 501(a), 29 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982), states:
The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It is,
therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the
organization and its members and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance
with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of an
adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any
pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interest of such organization, and to
account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor
organization or a general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve
any such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section shall be void as
against public policy.
110. LMRDA § 501(b), 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982), states:
When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section and the labor
organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or
secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organization, such member may sue such
officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court of the United States or
in any State court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure an accounting or
other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization. No such proceeding shall
be brought except upon leave of the court obtained upon verified application and for good
cause shown, which application may be made ex parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action under this subsection to pay the fees of counsel
prosecuting the suit at the instance of the member of the labor organization and to compensate such member for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection
with the litigation.
111. See supra note 105.
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Congress adopted the freedom of speech and assembly provision in order
to promote union democracy. It recognized that democracy would be
assured only if union members are free to discuss union policies and criticize the leadership without fear of reprisal. Congress also recognized
that this freedom is particularly critical, and deserves vigorous protection, in the context of election campaigns. For it is in elections that
members can wield their power, and directly express their approval or
disapproval of the union leadership.12

This free speech right is not absolute, however. The proviso to section 101(a)(2) allows certain "reasonable" restrictions to be placed on
that right. In the context of union meetings, member speech may be
limited to "business properly before the meeting" and subject to "reasonable rules relating to the conduct of meetings." This limitation is primarily procedural in nature and only indirectly allows the union to regulate
the content of a member's speech. The union has the authority to maintain order and establish procedures to be followed during meetings. 1 13 A
union may properly discipline a member who insists upon criticizing the
union's decision to expend dues money to build a new union hall when
the subject currently before the union meeting is the negotiation of a new
collective bargaining agreement. Likewise, a member who consistently
disrupts a meeting by shouting out criticism of the union's business manager is not insulated from union discipline. Regulation is permitted in
those instances in order to facilitate the orderly conduct of union meetings, not to permit union officers to control or censor the content of
14
member speech.'
As to all union member speech, regardless of context, the union retains the ability to enforce "reasonable rules as to the responsibility of
every member toward the organization as an institution" and to regulate
conduct interfering with the performance of the union's legal or contractual obligations.' 15 It is this proviso which raises the issue of the union's
legitimate right to control the content of member speech.
If broadly interpreted, particularly from a united front, 1 6 business
112. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 112 (1982) (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., Petramale v. Local 17, Laborers, 736 F.2d 13, 17 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1087 (1984); Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228,
1239 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); Patterson v. Tulsa Local 513, Motion Picture
Operators, 446 F.2d 205, 210 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 976 (1972); Scovile v. Watson,
338 F.2d 678, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965); see also Atleson, A Union
Member's Right of Free Speech and Assembly: Institutional Interests and Individual Rights, 51
MINN. L. REV. 403, 441-43 (1967); Beaird & Player, Free Speech and the Landrum-Griffin Act, 25
ALA. L. REV. 577, 596 (1973).
114. But see Atleson, supra note 113 (procedural rules can be manipulated by those controlling
the meeting so as to effectively censor the content of the member's speech at the meeting); Scovile,
338 F.2d at 682 (Schnackenberg, J., dissenting).
115. See supra note 105.
116. James, Union Democracy and the LMRDA: Autocracy and Insurgency in National Union
Elections, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 250-51 (1978).
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unionism1" 7 perspective, the proviso would appear to permit the union
great leeway in controlling member political criticism. Under this view,
a united, militant organization is required for the successful realization of
bargaining objectives when dealing with the employer. Thus, the necessity for obedience to union leadership and the importance of internal harmony is emphasized. Political dissidents destroy that harmony and
create divisiveness, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the union.' 18
Such an interpretation would allow the exception to swallow the rule.
The courts, however, in interpreting section 101(a)(2) have broadly
read the grant of rights and narrowly confined the effect of the proviso on
those rights. The leading case under section 101(a)(2) is Salzhandler v.
Caputo."I9 Salzhandler, the financial secretary of a Carpenters' local, distributed leaflets to the membership accusing the union's president,
Webman, of mishandling union funds. Webman filed internal union
charges against Salzhandler, alleging that the accusations against him
were false and as such constituted acts detrimental to the interests of the
union and inconsistent with a member's obligations to the union. After a
hearing before a union trial board, Salzhandler was found guilty and was
barred from attending, voting at, or participating in union meetings for a
period of five years.' 20 Subsequently, Salzhandler filed suit in federal
district court pursuant to section 102 of the LMRDA, alleging that the
union's discipline infringed his free speech rights under section 101(a)(2).
The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Title I of the
LMRDA does "not include the right of a union member to libel or slander officers of the union." 121
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and directed entry of judgment for Salzhandler. The court considered the policy underlying the
Act as one of "protect[ing] the rights of union members to discuss freely
and criticize the management of their unions and the conduct of their
officers.' 122 Accordingly, the statute specifically evinces a congressional
intent to "prevent union officials from using their disciplinary powers to
silence criticism and punish those who dare to question and
complain."

123

The union expressly raised the united front contention as justification for its regulation of Salzhandler's speech. 124 The court rejected this
defense, noting that in enacting Title I, Congress had decided that pro117. Pope, Free Speech Rights of Union Officials Under the Labor-ManagementReporting and
DisclosureAct, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 525, 532-33 (1983).
118. Id.; James, supra note 116.
119. 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946 (1963).
120. Salzhandler was also removed from his position as financial secretary. Id. at 448.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 448-49.

123.

Id. at 449.

124.

Id. at 451.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:339

tecting internal democratic processes outweighed any possible damage
which free expression might inflict on unions in their dealings with employers.12 5 "The Congress has decided that it is in the public interest
that unions be democratically governed and toward that end that discussion should be free and untrammeled and that reprisals within the union
for the expression of views should be prohibited." '2 6
In effect, the court found the free speech guarantee of section
101(a)(2) to be nearly absolute and the union's ability to regulate such
speech pursuant to the proviso to be severely limited. Subsequent case
law reaffirmed this absolutist approach and courts rarely have found
union institutional, contractual or legal interests sufficient to outweigh
the member's speech rights. 127 Although the Supreme Court in United
Steelworkers v. Sadlowski 128 has slightly retrenched on this absolutist
view and read content back into the proviso,' 29 the decision left unaf125.

Id.

126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers Union, Local 24-P, 473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.
1973) (member criticism of union negotiation stance protected); Semancik v. United Mine Workers
Dist. No. 5, 466 F.2d 144, 153 (3d Cir. 1972) ("whenever a union member is to be disciplined for
discussing the fitness of union leaders, their policies or their administration, he may claim the protection of the LMRDA's Bill of Rights"); Airline Maintenance Lodge 702 v. Loudermilk, 444 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1971) (member advocacy in support of rival union protected); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964) (member who urged fellow union members not to pay
dues protected). For a good discussion of the application of the proviso to free speech cases after
Salzhandler see Beaird & Player, supra note 113, at 593-606; J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, supra
note 102, at 39-45.
128. 457 U.S. 102 (1982). For a discussion of the Sadlowski case see Lansing & Denbaum, A
Setback for Democracy in Union Elections: Sadlowski v. United Steelworkers of America, 62 DEN.
U.L.REV. 653, 662 (1985); Note, Steelworkers v. Sadlowski: Undermining Unionism Through Restrictions Upon Campaign Financingand Speech, 48 ALB. L. REV. 173 (1983); Chayes, The Supreme
Court 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 290-91, 295-96 (1982).
129. In Sadlowski, the plaintiff challenged a union rule prohibiting a candidate for union office
from accepting financial support from a nonmember. 457 U.S. at 105. Sadlowski contended that the
rule prevented candidates from amassing the resources necessary for effectively exercising their free
speech rights during an election campaign. After considering the legislative history of Title I, the
Court rejected the argument that Congress intended to grant union members free speech rights
coextensive with citizen rights under the first amendment. "Rather, Congress' decision to include a
proviso covering 'reasonable' rules refutes that proposition." Id. at 111. Whereas government infringement on first amendment rights must be justified by a compelling state interest and narrowly
drawn, union rules are valid under the proviso so long as they are reasonable. "The critical question
is whether a rule that partially interferes with a protected interest is nevertheless reasonably related
to the protection of the organization as an institution." Id. at 111-12.
In upholding the outsider rule under the proviso, the Court specifically noted that as a practical
matter the impact of the rule on free speech rights "may not be substantial" as 1) candidates remain
free to seek support from union members, and 2) the rule does not prohibit union members who are
not running for office from using outside money to address particular issues. Id. at 113-15. Moreover, the interest advanced by the regulation was viewed by the Court as consistent with an underlying policy of the LMRDA-to ensure that the union remains responsive to its members and to
minimize the influence of outsiders on union affairs. Id. at 115-16.
These same extenuating considerations are not present where union restrictions infringe individual member speech based on the critical content of the speech. The Sadlowski rule only indirectly
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fected prior authority prohibiting union retaliation against a member for
criticism of, or opposition to, the union leadership and its policies. 13 0
The continuing vitality of Salzhandler, as it affects the ability of a
union to regulate the content of members' speech, has been reaffirmed by
the Second Circuit in Petramalev. Local 17, Laborers."'3 A post-Sadlowski decision, Petramale held that a union may not discipline a member
for accusations made against union officers. Thus, a union's attempt to
justify censorship of the content of a member's speech 1based
on the pro32
viso would fare no better after Sadlowski than before.
b.

Enforcement
(1)

Section 102

The primary mechanism for enforcing rights granted under Title I is
section 102.33 The scope of section 102 is relatively broad, providing a
interfered with speech-it limited the financial ability to disseminate ideas. A rule aimed at suppressing the content of speech itself substantially impacts on free speech rights. It is also contrary to
the underlying policy of the LMRDA by insulating the union from the concerns of some members
and undermining the union's ability to respond to those concerns.
130. See Chayes, supra note 128, concluding:
The Sadlowski decision does, however, contain language that may leave some speech
rights of union members intact. Although it held that Congress did not intend the protective scope of section 101(a)(2) to be identical to that of the first amendment, Sadlowski did
recognize that "Congress modeled Title I [of the LMRDA] after the Bill of Rights, and
that the legislators intended § 101(a)(2) to restate a principal First Amendment value-the
right to speak one's mind without fear of reprisal." Even after Sadlowski, one can argue
that union actions affecting certain core rights of expression must "pass the stringent tests
applied in the First Amendment context" rather than the mere reasonableness test applied
to the outsider rule adopted by the Steelworkers.
Further, Sadlowski may even help to define these core rights. For example, although
the right to solicit outside financial support during a campaign for high union office is not
within this core, "the right to speak one's mind without fear of reprisal" is. It thus appears, for example, that a union could neither discipline a member for exercising his right
to criticize the union leadership nor decide, on the basis of content, which messages members may post on union bulletin boards. This core right may deserve exactly the protection
it would receive under the first amendment, and implicit recognition of this core may limit
the scope of the Court's holding.
Id. at 297-98 (footnotes omitted).
131. 736 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1984). The court specifically relied on Salzhandleras support for its
decision. Id. at 17-18.
132. See, e.g. Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510, 1511 n.1 (I th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1284 (1986) (the court noted the protection given to views, arguments and opinions under
§ 101(a)(2) while dismissing the case based on the running of the statute of limitations); Rivera v.
Feinstein, 636 F. Supp. 159, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("It is well settled law in this circuit that the
statements contained in the newsletter which concern internal union affairs and which criticize union
officers are protected by section 101(a)(2), even if these statements are defamatory or malicious.");
Loekle v. Hansen, 551 F. Supp. 74, 80-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (relying on Salzhandler's broad protection of union member speech but finding the conduct of the union members in this case to be outside
the purview of Salzhandler since the members knowingly lied concerning missing union election
ballots, thereby attacking the validity of the election).
The extent to which Sadlowski affects the protection afforded member speech unrelated to criticism of and opposition to union officials is beyond the scope of this Article.
133. See supra note 106.
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cause of action for any infringement of a right secured by Title I. To
paraphrase the Supreme Court in Finnegan v. Leu, 134 the question remains whether a union member's right to free speech, secured by Title I,
is infringed by union manipulation of the hiring hall which redounds to
the detriment of the individual member.
In Murphy v. IUOE, Local 18,131 the court found such infringement
of free speech rights resulting from a union's discriminatory operation of
the referral system. The union had argued that its conduct did not constitute infringement of Murphy's free speech rights since he still retained
his ability to speak out as a union member. The economic discrimination
which he suffered only indirectly interfered with the exercise of that
right. Such indirect interference, the union contended, is not actionable
under section 101 (a)(2).13 6 The court rejected the union's contention and
found that the economic discrimination suffered by Murphy as a result of
the manipulation of hiring hall referrals constituted an infringement of
his right to speak and therefore was actionable under section 102.137
The union's argument was based on its reading of the Supreme
Court's decision in Finnegan v. Leu.1 38 In Finnegan, a union business
agent who had supported the incumbent union president during a hotly
contested election campaign was fired from his position by the challenger
who won the election. The business agent filed suit under the LMRDA
alleging, inter alia, that his right to free speech had been infringed when
he was discharged. 139 The Court initially noted that Title I protects the
rights of union members, not union officers or employees. This focus on
membership rights was central to the Court's determination that the discharge from union office did not give rise to a cause of action under section 102.1"
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
his Title

456 U.S. 431 (1982).
774 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1201 (1986).
Id. at 122-23.
Cf. Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1976).
456 U.S. 431 (1982).
Id. at 433-34. Plaintiff also alleged that the discharge constituted discipline for exercising
I rights in violation of § 101(a)(5) and § 609. This portion of the decision is discussed infra

in the text accompanying notes 164-71.
140. 456 U.S. at 435-37, 440-41. The Court did indicate that where dismissal from union office
is "part of a purposeful and deliberate attempt ... to suppress dissent within the union," thereby

implicating the free speech rights of members, such union conduct may be subject to attack under
§ 102. Id. at 441. See also Cotter v. Owens, 753 F.2d 223, 228-30 (2d Cir. 1985).
The distinction between directly protecting an officer from retaliatory discharge (which is not
intended by the LMRDA) and affording indirect protection to that officer where the discharge is
aimed at suppressing member rights (which may be within the scope of the LMRDA) is similar to
the treatment given to supervisors under the NLRA. The NLRA specifically excludes supervisors

from coverage. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982). Thus a supervisor who is discharged for
engaging in union organizing activity is not protected and is not entitled to reinstatement.

See

Beasley v. Food Fair, 416 U.S. 653 (1974). However, where the discharge of a supervisor implicates
employee rights under the NLRA, for example where a supervisor is discharged for refusing to

1987]

HIRING HALL ABUSE

In focusing on member rights, the Court looked to the policy behind
the LMRDA-to insure that unions would be democratically governed
and responsive to the will of the membership. The ability of a union
president to select his own administrative and policymaking employees
was seen as not only consistent with the purposes of the Act but as an
"integral part of ensuring a union administration's responsiveness to the
mandate of the union election." '4 1 This policy distinction between the
member's right to criticize and the union officer-employee's criticism was
42
effectively expressed by the court in Cehaich v. UAW'
Any union member is certainly entitled to disagree with the union's policy. However, when persons chosen by the union leadership are appointed to effectuate that policy, elected union officers are investing the
appointee with the trust of the membership. When that trust is lost, not
only will the appointee be subject 143
to removal; but the elected official has
placed his office in jeopardy also.
Moreover, the discharged union officer maintains her right to speak
out as a member-her status as a union member remains unaffected. The
Finnegan Court viewed the officer's choice between his job and his right
to speak out as presenting only an indirect interference with his membership rights.'
This statement, however, should be viewed in light of the
policy perspective articulated by the Court for allowing such interference
on the union's part: the necessity for the union leader to be able to trust
and rely on his staff to implement the policies for which he was elected.
The Court noted there was nothing in the statute or its legislative history
suggesting a congressional intent to prohibit union patronage, and while
this may "pose a dilemma" for some union employees, it was not a dicoercively interrogate employees about their union activities, the discharge violates § 8(a)(l) and the
supervisor is entitled to reinstatement because of the need to vindicate the employees' exercise of
their rights. Parker-Robb Chevrolet, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 402 (1982), aff'd, 711 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
141. 456 U.S. at 441. The Court noted that the result might be different in a case involving
nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential employees. Id. at 441 n. 11. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun emphasized the distinction between employees who are instrumental in developing and carrying
out the union's policies, and rank-and-file employees, which latter group he believed presented an
entirely different issue. Id. at 442-43. The extent of protection afforded union officers and employees, while an important issue, is beyond the scope of this Article. For some views on this issue, see
Pope, supra note 117, at 551-84; Note, Finnegan v. Leu: Promoting Union Democracy, 32 CATH.
U.L. REV. 287, 310-14 (1982); Note, Finnegan v. Leu: A Withdrawal of the Free Speech andAssociation Rights of Appointed Union Officers, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 644, 662-63 (1983).
142. 710 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1983). Cehaich was a union-appointed benefit representative who
was removed from office for criticizing the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union.
He challenged his removal based on LMRDA §§ 101(a)(2), 102, 609, 29 U.S.C. §§ 41 1(a)(2), 412,
529 (1982). The court affirmed the dismissal of his case based on Finnegan's holding that Title I
does not restrict the freedom of union officials to appoint and remove staff members responsible for
implementing union policy. Cehaich, 710 F.2d at 238-39.
143. Cehaich, 710 F.2d at 239 (emphasis in original).
144. 456 U.S. at 440.
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lemma with which Congress was concerned.' 45
Where a union dispatcher manipulates hiring hall referral practices
to disadvantage a member because of that member's criticism of union
policies and leadership, the analysis underlying the Finnegan decision is
inapposite. As recognized by the Murphy court, the Finnegan decision
was based on the Court's concern that a union leader be able to choose
her own people to help her run the union. "Plainly, the Supreme Court
in Finnegan did not intend to rule out Section 411 as a protection against
manipulative discrimination on behalf of an ordinary union' 4 member
1 6
seeking to exercise his right of expression at union meetings.'
The speech rights implicated in a hiring hall case are those of the
member, whose rights are specifically protected by Title I, not those of
the officer-employee, who receives no independent protection under the
Act. Unlike union employment, which involves effectuating internal
union policies, employment with outside employers does not implicate
those policies. Denying the member access to jobs does not serve the
policy of making the union responsive to the will of the members but
rather acts to suppress the voicing of the members' will, thereby running
counter to the Act's policy. As noted previously, 47 political discrimination in job referrals operates not only to suppress critical speech and dissent by the discriminatee, who suffers an economic loss as a result of his
temerity in speaking out, but also has a chilling effect on other union
members who learn the cost of dissent.
Additionally, requiring a member to choose between nondiscriminatory referral services and free speech directly interferes with a membership right and does not comport with any explicit or implicit statutory
policies. Where the union operates a nonexclusive hiring hall, an individual's right to utilize the service is based on her membership status in the
union. 4 ' This membership right of access to the hall is directly interfered with when the dispatcher discriminatorily refers members to jobs
based on their union political views. The member's status is affected because treatment of a member differs based on his speech-nondissenters
are given preferential access to jobs and dissenters are denied referrals.
Where the union operates an exclusive hall, access cannot be limited
solely to members.' 4 9 The union may, however, charge nonmembers a
fee for the use of the service.' ° Membership status, therefore, carries
145.
146.
147.
148.
327, 167
149.
NLRA.
150.

Id. at 441-42.
Murphy, 774 F.2d at 123.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
A union may deny nonmembers the use of a nonexclusive hiring hall. Teamsters Local
N.L.R.B. 998 (1967).
Restricting access to exclusive referral systems to union members violates § 8(b)(2) of the
R. GORMAN, supra note 36, at 664-65.
See supra note 36.

HIRING HALL ABUSE

19871

with it the right of free access to the union hiring hall. This status is
affected where the service rendered by the dispatcher varies based on the
political content of the member's speech.
Thus, unlike employment by the union itself, external employment
opportunities secured through the use of the union hiring hall are a function of the member's internal union status. When those employment opportunities are affected, the member's status in the union is affected.
Legislative history supports this interpretation. In the debate preceding enactment of Title I, Congress expressed concern about protecting
members from job loss in reprisal for exercising their free speech rights.
While offering the initial version of Title I,151 Senator McClellan discussed the need for enacting a law defining union member rights, and
protecting members in the exercise of these rights. He noted that there
currently existed no protection for a member from "job-loss as reprisals
for assembling, for speaking up in meetings, for making inquiry about the
financial affairs or other actions of his union."' 5 2 In discussing his proposed "freedom of speech" provision, Senator McClellan referred to two
waitresses who had testified that it took them six months to find jobs
because union officials interfered with their employment opportunities
and warned employers not to hire them.' 5 3 Thus, unlike the union employment patronage problem which received no discussion during the
consideration of the LMRDA,' 5 4 there was a voiced concern about the
effect of union interference with members' job opportunities in reprisal
for exercising their free speech rights, a concern which led to the eventual passage of Title I.
A member's right to speak out in criticism of union officers and policies is protected by section 101(a)(2). While the proviso to that section
allows for some union restrictions on this right, the proviso is narrowly
construed. Union manipulation of a hiring hall referral system to punish
members for exercising their speech rights does not fall within the proviso, and it infringes upon rights protected by Title I in violation of section 102 of the LMRDA.
151. Sen. McClellan's proffered Title I was not the version which was eventually enacted into
law. Shortly after its adoption by the Senate, Sen. Kuchel offered a substitute amendment which was
approved. The major difference between the two bills affecting the free speech clause, § 101(a)(2),
was that the Kuchel amendment included the "reasonable rules" proviso. See supro text accompanying notes 113-18. The House bill, which contained a Bill of Rights provision identical to the
Senate-adopted Title I, was subsequently approved. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 109-10; Rothman, supra
note 103, at 206-09. Nevertheless, Sen. McClellan's comments are clearly relevant to an understanding of congressional intent behind § 101(a)(2).
152. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1098 (1959) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LMRDA].

153.

Id. at 1103.

154.

Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 441 & n.12.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:339

(2) Section 609
An alternative mechanism for enforcement of Title I rights is found
at section 609 of the LMRDA. t55 This provision is at once broader and
more narrow than section 102.156 Section 609 protects the rights of
union members granted under any provision of the LMRDA, whereas
section 102 protections are limited to Title I rights. Thus a right secured
by Title I, such as the member's free speech right, falls within the ambit
of both section 102 and section 609. However, section 609 prohibits only
that union action which constitutes a fine, suspension, expulsion or other
discipline, whereas section 102 prohibits any infringement.
The distinction between union activity which infringes Title I rights
and that which constitutes discipline for the exercise of those rights is a
substantive one. A plaintiff may be able to state a cause of action under
section 102 without necessarily stating a cause of action under section
609. 57 As discussed previously, union interference with outside employment opportunities by virtue of discriminatory manipulation of the hiring hall system constitutes infringement. Whether such conduct also
constitutes discipline will be discussed below in connection with consideration of the applicability of section 101(a)(5) to the political abuse of
hiring halls.
2.

Section 101(a)(5) and Section 609

Section 101(a)(5) prohibits a union from fining, suspending, expelling or otherwise disciplining any member without first observing certain
procedural safeguards.1 58 The purpose behind this provision is not to
review the reason for the discipline or to determine whether it is warranted. Rather it is to ensure that the member has an opportunity to
protect her interests and present her defense before any discipline is im155. See supra note 107.
156. The Finnegan Court explained that the somewhat duplicative nature of these two sections,
§ 102 and § 609, is the result in large part of the peculiar legislative history of the LMRDA. Section
102 was originally part of the Kuchel amendment and provided for individual civil enforcement of
Title I rights. Section 609 was originally included for the purpose of creating criminal penalties for
retaliatory discipline primarily related to the election provisions (Title IV) of the LMRDA. Subsequent amendments to § 609 provided for civil enforcement by the Secretary of Labor instead of
criminal sanctions in order to temper the penalty. Eventually individual enforcement mechanisms
were substituted to remove unnecessary injection of the executive branch in law enforcement matters. 456 U.S. at 439 n. 10. See Rothman, supra note 103, at 218-19; see also Aaron, supra note 103,
at 877.
157. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 439 (having initially determined that the discharge of the business
agent did not constitute discipline under § 609, the Court was required to separately consider
whether such action constituted infringement under § 102); Murphy, 774 F.2d at 122 ("[A] suit may
be brought to redress an infringement of section 411 rights even if no improper 'discipline' is
shown."). See also Cehaich v. UAW, 710 F.2d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 1983).
158. See supra note 108.
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posed.' 5 9 The failure of the union to provide these procedural protections renders the subsequent discipline voidable. The union may,
however, remedy this defect by providing the member with her due process rights, and thereafter reimpose the discipline. 6 °
Section 609, which also regulates union discipline, prohibits a union
from disciplining any member for exercising his rights under the
LMRDA. 161 Under this provision, the reason for the imposition of discipline is subject to review. If the justification is retaliation for exercising
LMRDA rights, the discipline is illegal. Even if the union grants the
disciplined member all his procedural rights under section 101(a)(5), the
section 609-it is unlawful to impose disciunion's conduct still violates
162
pline for that reason.
Regardless of whether the member is challenging the union's action
as procedurally or substantively defective, the crucial question is the
same: does the union's action constitute discipline? The meaning of the
term discipline as used in section 101(a)(5) and section 609 is the
same. 163 The question, then, is whether the loss of employment opportunities that occurs by virtue of the union's discriminatory operation of the
hiring hall constitutes discipline?
The starting point for considering this question is once again Finnegan v. Leu. 164 There the Court held that the term discipline "refers only
to retaliatory actions that affect a union member's rights or status as a
member of the union."165 The specific sanctions mentioned in the statute-fine, suspension, and expulsion-all refer to actions taken against
members as members. Discipline, therefore, refers only to punitive action diminishing membership rights, and not to discharge from union
employment, as such discharge does not impinge upon the incidents of
166
union membership.
The Court in Finnegan focused on the distinction between union
159. See International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 242-45 (1971); Goodman v. Laborers' Local 135, 742 F.2d 780, 783 (3d Cir. 1984).
160. See Perry v. Milk Drivers' Union, Local 302, 656 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1981); Feltington v.
Moving Picture Mach. Operators Local 306, 605 F.2d 1251, 1257 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 943 (1980); see, e.g., Tincher v.Piasecki, 520 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1975); Anderson v.United Bhd.
of Carpenters, 59 L.R.R.M. (BNA)2684 (D.Minn. 1965).
161. See supra note 107.
162. Grand Lodge of the IAM v.King, 335 F.2d 340, 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920
1980).
(1964); see also Maxwell v. UAW, Local 1306, 489 F. Supp. 745 (C.D. Ill.
163. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 437-39. The scope of union conduct regulated by both provisions is
identical: "fine, suspend, expel or otherwise discipline." Thus, while the purposes of the two sections are different, the conduct being regulated is the same. "Certainly, one would expect that if
Congress had intended identical language to have substantially different meanings in different sections of the same enactment it would have manifested its intention in some concrete fashion." Id. at
438-39 n.9.
164. 456 U.S. 431 (1982).
165. Id. at 437 (emphasis in original).
166. Id. at 438.
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employment and union membership in finding that the termination of the
union business agent was not discipline. This distinction should be
remembered when considering the applicability of Finnegan to union interference with outside employment. If Finnegan were broadly read, one
might conclude that interference with any employment is not discipline.
As discussed previously, however, access to employment may in some
so that
circumstances be a function of an individual's membership status,
1 67
interference with that access does affect a member's status.
It is essential to keep in mind the context of Finnegan-theCourt's
concern with the interest of union leaders in appointing employees they
can trust, and its belief that Congress did not intend to abolish patronage. Indeed, the Finnegan Court cited Sheridan v. CarpentersLocal
626161 in connection with its holding that discharge from union office
does not affect union membership. 169 In Sheridan the court gave due
consideration to the political ramifications of an officer's actions in finding that his removal did not constitute discipline. An "officer's conduct,
whether in his individual or official capacity, affects the confidence reposed in him by the union membership, and his effectiveness as an
officer."

170

The other ground for the Finnegan decision that discharge from
union office did not constitute discipline was the legislative history behind section 101(a)(5) which showed a specific congressional intent "not
to protect a member's status as a union employee or officer."'' There is
no similar legislative indication that Congress did not mean to protect a
member's outside employment opportunities from disciplinary effects.
Whether union interference with outside employment opportunities
constitutes discipline has been the subject of considerable debate since
the passage of the LMRDA. 17 2 After Finnegan, the real question is not
167. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
168. Sheridan v. Carpenters Local 626, 306 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1962).
169. Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438.
170. Sheridan, 306 F.2d at 157. The recognition of this distinction between union employment
and outside employment was highlighted in Murphy, in which the court found denial of outside
work opportunities distinguishable from Finnegan, where the work involved was as an appointed
employee of the union itself. Murphy, 774 F.2d at 122 n.5.
171. "The Conference Report... explains that this 'prohibition on suspension without observing
certain safeguards applies only to suspension of membership in the union; it does not refer to suspension of a member's status as an officer of the union.' " Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 438 (emphasis in
original).
172. Beaird & Player, Union Discipline of its Membership Under Section 101 (a) (5) of LandrumGriffin: What is "Discipline" and How Much Process is Due?, 9 GA. L. REV. 383, 391-98 (1975);
Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARV. L. REV. 727, 731-34
(1969); Comment, Applicability ofLMRDA Section 101 (a)(5) to Union Interference with Employment
Opportunities, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 700 (1966).
Disagreement over this issue is also reflected in court opinions, although the majority view
clearly held that union interference with the outside employment relation can constitute discipline.
See, e.g., Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
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whether union interference with employment does or does not constitute
per se discipline. Rather the issue is whether, under the factual circumstances presented, union conduct which affects employment causes a
change in the individual's status, or diminution of her rights as a
member.
The Fifth Circuit has long employed a Finnegan-type criterion for
determining whether union conduct is discipline.' 7 3 Asking whether the
union conduct affected the individual's membership within the union, the
Fifth Circuit has held union interference with outside employment to
constitute discipline in some situations

74

but not in others.' 75 A look at

how the Fifth Circuit has applied this test should provide some guidance
as to how the courts will handle a case alleging political manipulation of
a hiring hall in a post-Finnegan context.
In Seeley v. Brotherhoodof Painters,176 the plaintiff, upon being promoted to a supervisory position, withdrew from active membership in the
union. He maintained an "inactive" status in order to retain accumulated seniority and fringe benefit rights. 177 When a labor dispute arose
between the union and the plaintiff's employer, plaintiff was blamed for
instigating the trouble. The union threatened the employer with coercive
1 78
measures if plaintiff was not discharged, and the employer complied.
When plaintiff obtained a supervisory position with another employer, a
labor dispute once more occurred for which plaintiff was again
blamed.' 7 9 The union threatened to strike unless plaintiff was discharged
929 (1961) (placing member's name on "unfair list" making it virtually impossible to obtain employment); Vandeventer v. IUOE, Local 513, 579 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978)
(refusal to refer political opponent to jobs through hiring hall); Poulos v. Bracco, 117 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 3063 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (post-Finnegan;causing employer to discharge member); Tirino v.
Local 164, Bartenders Union, 282 F. Supp. 809 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (refusal to refer through hiring
hall); Gross v. Kennedy, 183 F. Supp. 750 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (removal of union member from job).
Contra Lucas v. Kenny, 220 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. I1. 1963) (failure to secure and assign work to a
union member); Allen v. Armored Car Chauffeurs Local 820, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1960) (failure to prosecute union member's grievance).
173. See Seeley v. Brotherhood of Painters, 308 F.2d 52, 59 (5th Cir. 1962) ("Certainly the
alleged 'discipline' must have some relation to the plaintiff's membership in the labor organization....

[I]t does not appear that the plaintiff's discharge ... ha[s] any relationship to his member-

ship in the Brotherhood.").
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals foreshadowed Finnegannot only in its analysis of discipline,
but also in its holding on facts similar to those presented to the Supreme Court in Finnegan. In
Wambles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974), the court upheld the
discharge of an assistant business manager because he had supported an unsuccessful candidate in
the union election. The court held that union officials have the right to expect loyalty to their
policies from those working with them and that the LMRDA was not intended to create a civil
service system for union employees. Id. at 889-90.
174. Keene v. IUOE, Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1978).
175. Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1976); Seeley, 308 F.2d at 59.
176. 308 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962).
177. Id. at 54.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 55.
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and this employer also complied.18 0 The court held that the union's actions did not constitute discipline as it had no effect on the plaintiff's
limited status within the union as an "inactive" member.1 8 ' His accumulated seniority and fringe benefits were not affected. Plaintiff's employment in a supervisory capacity with the two employers was not a
function of, nor related to, his union membership.' 82
In Miller v. Holden,'8 3 the plaintiff lost his job as the training coordinator of an apprenticeship program allegedly because he had actively
supported unsuccessful challengers to the incumbent officers in an internal union campaign. In analyzing the factual situation, the court found
that the union's conduct did not relate to the plaintiff's membership in
the union and was therefore not discipline.I8 4 The court did specifically
note, however, that discharge from employment would constitute discipline "when the member's employment status is a function of some internal union status, such as a hiring hall or, conversely, a union
blacklist."' 8"
This relationship between membership and employment was present
in Keene v. IUOE, Local 624.186 The court, accordingly, found that
union interference with employment opportunities affected membership
status and constituted discipline. The IUOE operated a union hiring hall
through which it referred union members to work, based on their place
on the out-of-work list. Keene was a member of the IUOE who unsuccessfully ran for union office. Subsequently, his political rivals, who controlled the operation of the hiring hall, manipulated the referral process
so as to deny Keene the opportunity to work. Citing Miller, the Fifth
Circuit found that the concept of discipline included the refusal to refer
the plaintiff from the referral list.'I 7
The key issue in both the Fifth Circuit line of cases and Finnegan is
whether the union, by virtue of its authority over the member, is able to
influence or affect employment status. In both Seeley and Finnegan, the
union's ability to affect the individual's employment status was based on
its influence over the employer-in Seeley the economic influence of the
strike on the employer and in Finnegan the fact that the union itself was
the employer. Where a hiring hall is involved, as in Keene, the union's
ability to affect the individual's work referrals is a direct result of its
authority over and relation to him as a union member. As noted previ180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 58-59.
Id.
535 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 915.
Id. (emphasis added).
569 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1379.
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ously, an individual's access to a nonexclusive hall, or free access to an
exclusive hall, is based solely on his membership status in the union. 8
It is by virtue of that membership status that the union gains control over
his employment status.18 9
This link between discipline of a union member and its resultant
effect on employment was recognized by Congress during its discussion
of Title I. In discussing his proposed section 101(a)(6), which, with some
changes not relevant to the meaning of "discipline," became section
101(a)(5), Senator McClellan noted that "union officials can expel a
member from the lodge and keep him from working ....

What we are

trying to do is to protect a man from being arbitrarily disciplined without
a fair hearing and without the right to protect his livelihood."' 9 ° Representative Rhodes, commenting on section 101(a)(5), also remarked that it
allows a union member to "protect the job he has, protect his craft or his
skill in the craft which he has acquired through the years. He cannot be
suspended or expelled, and deprived of his right to make a living, without
91
'

first being given a hearing."'

A post-Finnegan case which found the link between member status
and employment opportunities in a hiring hall context is Murphy v.
IUOE, Local 18.192 The union removed Murphy's name from the hiring
hall referral list because he had stolen a union master election list. Murphy alleged that the union violated section 101(a)(5) since he had received no procedural due process prior to the removal of his name. The
union, relying on Finnegan, argued that the removal of the name was
employment related and did not affect Murphy's rights as a union member, and therefore did not constitute discipline.' 93 The court disagreed:
The Union's action in foreclosing Murphy's participation in the work
referral program was a sanction which set him apart from other members
in good standing. It unquestionably affected his membership rights....
[T]he removal of the card [with Murphy's name] 94was discipline impermissibly imposed without a full and fair hearing.'
Murphy also alleged that, prior to the removal of his name from the
referral list, the union had manipulated the referral system to his detri188. See supra text accompanying notes 148-50.
189. Those courts which have been presented with the issue of political abuse of a union hiring
hall have unanimously found such conduct to constitute discipline. Murphy v. IUOE, Local 18, 774
F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1201 (1986) (post-Finnegan);Vandeventer v. IUOE,
Local 513, 579 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978); Keene v. IUOE, Local 624,
569 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1978); Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1976) (dicta); Kelsey v.
Philadelphia Local 8, IATSE, 294 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 419 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1064 (1970).
190. II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 152, at 1103.
191. Id. at 1666.
192. 774 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1201 (1986).
193. Id. at 123.
194. Id. at 123-24.
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ment in retaliation for his dissident union political activity. He claimed
that this manipulation also constituted discipline without the safeguards
required by section 101(a)(5).19 5 The district court had found that the
manipulation of the referrals merely lessened Murphy's chances for employment rather than totally denying him employment and therefore did
not constitute discipline.' 96 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted that the
district court's "conclusion that mere unsystematic manipulation, as opposed to a total foreclosure of such job referrals, may not constitute 'discipline' . . . represents a cautions [sic] approach to section 411." 197 The
appellate court did not, however, specifically affirm or reverse the district
court on this issue, because it affirmed the district court's finding that the
same conduct constituted an infringement of Murphy's free speech rights
under section 101(a)(2),' 98 and recovery under section 101(a)(5) would
be duplicative.
There is no basis in reason or precedent to distinguish between degrees of harm suffered for purposes of determining whether the conduct
causing the harm constitutes discipline. The punitive effect of the
union's conduct is present whether the member suffers a partial loss of
income or a total loss. 199
In the district court opinion, the court also referred to the "surreptitious" nature of the manipulation of referrals as militating against finding
the conduct to be discipline. 2 ° It held that in order to be discipline,
conduct must be not only punitive but also "undertaken under color of
the union's right to control the member's conduct in order to protect the
interests of the union or its membership." '' The court found no evidence that any union tribunal was involved in the manipulation; neither
did it serve the union's interests but rather it served the selfish political
and economic interests of certain members.2 °2 The district court's reliance on these factors in deciding that this aspect of the union's conduct
did not constitute discipline was misplaced.
Although a union action must be judicial in order to be considered
discipline, the nature of the procedure utilized in imposing the discipline
is not determinative as to whether or not the action is judicial. If the
195. Id. at 121.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 122.
198. Id. at 122-23. For a discussion of this aspect of Murphy see supra text accompanying notes
135-46.
199. There is a requirement that a member establish that she has suffered or will suffer some
detriment in order for union conduct to be considered discipline. Bougie v. Lake County Dist.
Council of the United Bhd. of Carpenters, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2402 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
200. Murphy v. Local 18, IUOE, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2074, 2115 n.327 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
201. Id. at 2115 (quoting Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912, 915-16 (5th Cir. 1976)).
202. Id. The court of appeals did not review this aspect of the district court's rationale for
finding that "mere manipulation" did not constitute discipline. 774 F.2d at 122.
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nature of proceedings controlled the characterization of the conduct, a
union could easily evade the requirements of section 101(a)(5) by avoiding the use of judicial proceedings or tribunals prior to imposing punitive
measures. 20 3 Rather, denominating the union's conduct as judicial serves
the purpose of distinguishing it from legislative or ministerial acts of the
union. 204
This distinction between judicial and ministerial acts was emphasized by the court of appeals in Murphy. The court distinguished the
results reached in two post-Finnegan cases as involving union ministerial
acts. 20 5 Both Turner v. Local Lodge 455, InternationalBrotherhood of
Boilermakers2 "6 and Hackenburg v. InternationalBrotherhood of Boilermakers2 7 involved union members claiming that the union's refusal to
refer them from the hiring hall constituted discipline. The union's refusal was based on a clause in the collective bargaining agreement requiring that any employee who engaged in an illegal or unauthorized strike
could not be referred from the hiring hall for ninety days. The union's
conduct in refusing to refer the members was, therefore, purely "Ministerial," based on the union's obligation to comply with its contractual commitments. 2 8 This is to be contrasted with union discretionary conduct
in manipulating the hiring hall process. Complying with agreed-upon
obligations is certainly different than singling out a union member for the
purpose of imposing punitive measures such as the denial of employment
opportunities, unrelated to any established rules or contractual obligations. The latter conduct constitutes a discretionary, judgmental act appropriately characterized as judicial.2°
To be actionable, discipline must be union-imposed. Action is
203.

J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 68.

204. See, e.g., Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976); Scovile, 338
F.2d at 680; Figueroa v. National Maritime Union, 342 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1965); Hayes v. IBEW,
Local 481, 83 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2647 (S.D. Ind. 1973); Beaird & Player, supra note 172, at 395-97;
Etelson & Smith, supra note 172, at 731-32.
This distinction between judicial and ministerial was explained by the court in Macaulay v.
Boston Typographical Union 13, 692 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1982). "The even-handed application of a
reasonable union rule is not arbitrary action by a union or its officers. It would be arbitrary, however, to use a union rule in bad faith in order to punish a member; this would constitute 'discipline'...." Id. at 204.
Scovile v. Watson, 338 F.2d 678 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963 (1965), involved
union legislative conduct. The union, during a membership meeting, passed a motion to refuse to
arbitrate cases where a member was guilty of excessive absenteeism. As a result of this motion,
plaintiff was denied arbitration. Plaintiff claimed she had been disciplined without notice or hearing.
The court held that the adoption and prospective uniform application of a union rule is not
discipline.
205.

Murphy, 774 F.2d at 122 n.5.

206.

755 F.2d 866 (11th Cir. 1985).

207.
208.

694 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1239; Turner, 755 F.2d at 868.

209.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 984 (5th ed. 1979).
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deemed to be union-imposed, however, when a union officer acts "under
color of and in abuse of authority." 2 1 Manipulation of hiring hall referrals would not be within the job description of a union officer. A union
officer who uses his admitted authority to supervise, or actually operate,
the hiring hall in a discriminatory manner has abused his authority. This
abuse of admitted authority constitutes more than mere private misconduct, however. The officer is in a position to inflict the injury on the
union member solely by virtue of the authority he possesses as an officer.
Thus discipline imposed by an officer constituting an abuse of authority
is attributable to the union.2" 1 ' Indeed the statute itself speaks of discipline being imposed by "such organization or by any officer thereof."2" 2
Finally, the motive behind the union's action is irrelevant for the purpose
2 13
of determining whether it constitutes discipline.
Thus, political abuse of the hiring hall system, whether it results in
total or partial denial of referrals, constitutes discipline within the meaning of section 101(a)(5) and section 609. It is union-imposed, discretionary rather than ministerial, and affects membership rights by virtue of
the union's authority over the dissident member's access to employment.
B. Applicability of Title V
In enacting section 501, Congress statutorily imposed fiduciary responsibilities on the officers, agents and representatives of labor organizations.2" 4 This did not represent the imposition of any new obligation
upon union leaders; the recognition of the fiduciary nature of the relationship existing between a union's officers and its members had its roots
in the common law.2 15 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R., 2 16 its landmark case establishing the union's duty of
fair representation, based that duty on the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the union and the employees it represents. "It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in
210.

See Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625, 630 (3d Cir. 1961) (Hastie, J., concurring).

211. See Aguirre v. Automotive Teamsters, 633 F.2d 168, 172-73 (9th Cir. 1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 216, 228-229, 236 & comment a, illustration 3 (1958).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1982).
213. Pittman v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 251 F. Supp. 323, 324 (M.D. Fla. 1966); J. BEL-

LACE & A. BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 68.
214. See supra note 109.
215. Union officials were considered fiduciaries at common law although the source and exact
nature of the duty owed was not clearly defined. Clark, The FiduciaryDuties of Union Officials
Under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 52 MINN. L. REV. 437, 454-57 (1967); Cox, Internal Affairs of
Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. REV. 819, 827-28 (1960); Dugan,
FiduciaryObligations Under the New Act, 48 GEO. L.J. 277, 279-83 (1959); Tarbutton, The Fiduciary

Responsibility of Officers of Labor Organizations Under the Common Law and LMRDA, in SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 513, 514-15
(R. Slovenko ed. 1961).
216. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf... .,217

While the specific duties and obligations of a fiduciary are determined by the context of the relationship, 2 18 as a general proposition a
fiduciary is one who "undertakes to act in the interest of another person" 2 19 and therefore owes a duty of loyalty to that person. 220 As noted
by Professor Cox, the general fiduciary guidelines contained in section
501 were adopted from the Restatement of Agency with the purpose of
incorporating common law fiduciary principles while keeping in mind
the special problems and functions of a union.22 1
An issue posed by the language of section 501 concerns the scope of
the fiduciary obligation imposed on union officials. Whereas the first
sentence seemingly imposes a broad obligation, the second sentence apparently limits that obligation to three specific areas: the management
and expenditure of union funds, the avoidance of conflict of interest or
dealing with the union as an adverse party, and accountability to the
union for profits received by officials.222 This textual ambiguity raised
the question whether the fiduciary obligation of union officers, agents and
representatives extends to all activities undertaken by these individuals
(as suggested by the first sentence) or whether it is limited to financial
dealings only (as suggested by the second sentence).
Extensive analysis of the legislative history of section 501 by commentators supports a broad reading of the fiduciary obligation imposed.22 3 This broad reading has also been adopted by the majority of
courts which have considered the issue. 22 4 Only the Second Circuit has
limited the application of section 501's fiduciary requirement solely to
217. Id. at 202.
218. See J. SHEPHERD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 21-22 (1981); Dugan, supra note 215, at 27879; Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539, 541 (1949).
219. Scott, supra note 218, at 540.
220. J.SHEPHERD, supra note 218, at 47-48; Scott, supra note 218, at 540-41; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
221. Cox, supra note 215, at 828.
222. See supra note 109.
223. See, Clark, supra note 215, at 440-44; Dugan, supra note 215, at 283-94; Kratzke, Fiduciary
Obligations in the Internal Political Affairs of Labor Unions Under Section 501(a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1019, 1020-23 (1977); Comment, Facilitating the Union Member's Right to Sue Under Sections 412 and 501(b) of LandrumGriffin, 58 GEO. L.J. 221, 236-37 (1969); Comment, Fiduciary Duties of Union Officers Under Section
501 of the LMRDA, 37 LA. L. REV. 875, 875-79 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Fiduciary Duties of
Union Officers]. Contra Comment, Counsel Fees for Union Officers Under the Fiduciary Provision of
Landrum-Griffin, 73 YALE L.J. 443, 449-51 (1964).
224. See, e.g., Stelling v. IBEW, Local 1547, 587 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 944 (1979); Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972);
McCabe v. IBEW Local 1377, 415 F.2d 92 (6th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Nelson, 325 F.2d 646 (8th
Cir. 1963). See also Comment, The Fiduciary Duty Under Section 501 of the LMRDA, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1189, 1190-93 (1975) [hereinafter Comment, Fiduciary Duty]; Comment, Fiduciary Duties of
Union Officers, supra note 223, at 879-80.
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fiscal matters.22 5
Applying the majority analysis of the scope of section 501, union
officers and representatives are required to exercise their authority in all
activiies undertaken, both financial and operational, in the best interests
of the union as an institution and the members as a group. Courts have
recognized that one of the interests of both the union and its members is
the preservation of internal union democracy; section 501 imposes a duty
on union officers to exercise their authority so as to protect the political
rights necessary to preserve democracy.22 6 Thus, an officer who abuses
her authority to the detriment of the political rights of union members
has breached her fiduciary obligation.2 2 7
In Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers,22 8 the union was embroiled in a controversy over whether to participate in a particular pension fund. The union president and certain other officers of the local
personally favored adoption of the fund. When submitted for approval
to the membership, participation in the plan was defeated. Thereafter,
the union president used his authority to call union meetings repeatedly
until he was finally able to railroad acceptance through the membership.
He subsequently ignored a valid petition to call another membership
meeting to reconsider the pension plan; when that meeting was finally
held, he failed to implement the vote not to retain the pension plan. The
district court found that the union president had breached his fiduciary
duty by allowing his personal feelings to interfere with his official duties.22 9 The Eighth Circuit affirmed stating that the "restoration of or225. Gurton v. Arons, 339 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1964). The Second Circuit's narrow reading has
been criticized as based on the legislative history of a version of § 501 which was not the provision
ultimately enacted. Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1386-87; Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l
Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825, 834 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973); J. BELLACE & A.
BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 285-86; Clark, supra note 215, at 444; Comment, FiduciaryDuties of
Union Officers, supra note 223, at 879-80.
Several circuits, while acknowledging the opposing views on this issue, have not indicated
which view they espouse. Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Carr v. Learner, 547
F.2d 135 (1st Cir. 1976); Lux v. Blackman, 546 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1976). But see Roland v. Airline
Employees Ass'n, Civ. No. 84-6168 (N.D. Ill. filed May 2, 1985); Hill v. Marine Ass'n, Civ. No. 858436 (N.D. Ill. filed Nov. 27, 1985), in which these district courts interpreted Lux as endorsing the
Second Circuit's narrow view.
226. Semancik, 466 F.2d at 155 ("Union officers ...have a fiduciary duty under Section 501 ...
to insure the political rights of all members of their organization."); Retail Clerks Local 648 v. Retail
Clerks Int'l Union, 299 F. Supp. 1012, 1021 (D.D.C. 1969) ("Title V's obligations encompass not
only the proper handling of money but the protection of political rights as well.").
227. Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1067 (1973); Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd in pertinent
part, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976). See J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ,
supra note 102, at 290-91; Comment, FiduciaryDuty, supra note 224, at 1204-05; Comment, Fiduciary Duties of Union Officers, supra note 223, at 885-86. See also Leslie, FederalCourts and Union
Fiduciaries,76 COLUM. L. REv. 1314, 1322-25 (1976).
228. 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1067 (1973).
229. 343 F. Supp. 237, 243 (D. Neb. 1972).
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derly democratic processes to the local union is clearly a benefit to the
labor organization, and a proper subject of concern to the entire
membership." 2 3
In Blanchard v. Johnson,"' an unaffiliated local union was being
courted by several international unions proposing affiliation. The union
president negotiated an affiliation arrangement with the International
Longshoremen's Association ("ILA") and submitted the question of affiliation to a membership vote. The union president did not, however, inform the members of affiliation proposals received from other unions, nor
did he fully disclose all the details of the affiliation arrangement negotiated with the ILA.23 2 The court found that the union officers had
breached their fiduciary obligation by using their right as union officials
"to discuss union matters as an excuse to withhold pertinent, relevant
information.'233
This same analysis applies to the union officer who uses her position
in administering the hiring hall system to manipulate referrals to the disadvantage of political opponents or to the advantage of political allies.
She occupies a position of trust which she is to use solely for the benefit
and interests of the union and its members. Instead, she has used that
position to further her own interests in solidifying her political position,
to the detriment of the union's interest in internal democracy.23 4 As
noted by Professor Leslie, the fiduciary concept is based on the notion of
fidelity-the fiduciary gives his undivided loyalty to his principal (here,
the union) and may not permit his actions to be affected by a desire for
personal gain, including a desire to consolidate political position, punish
enemies, or reward friends.2 3 5 Thus, political abuse of the hiring hall
constitutes a breach of the fiduciary responsibility imposed on union officers by section 501.
C. Litigation Issues
Union members can enforce the rights granted under Titles I and V
by filing a civil suit in federal court.23 6 The litigation of such suits is
230. 477 F.2d at 835.
231. 388 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd in pertinent part, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976).
232. Id. at 212-13.
233. Id. at 214.
234. As noted previously, political abuse of the hiring hall system not only impacts on the particular individual who loses the job referral, but also serves as an example to deter other union
members from exercising their political rights. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
235. Leslie, supra note 227, at 1325 & n.61.
236. See 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982) (quoted supra note 106); 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982) (quoted
supranote 110). Union members may also sue in any state court of competent jurisdiction to enforce
the fiduciary obligations of § 501(a). 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982).
The provisions of LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1982), also apply to the enforcement of
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governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in general conforms to the legal rules applicable to most federal litigation. There are,
however, certain procedural and substantive peculiarities connected with
LMRDA lawsuits.
1. Preemption
The concept of preemption is based on the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution,2 37 which mandates that federal law supersedes conflicting state law and that federal regulation of a specific field
may totally occupy that field to the exclusion of parallel state regulation.2 38 In the field of labor law, the general principle of preemption was
established by the Supreme Court in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon.239 The preemption principle is based on two theories, the
substantive rights theory and the primary jurisdiction theory.24 The
premise of the substantive rights theory is that allowing the states to regulate or control conduct which is within the scope of the NLRA would
create a conflict between state and federal regulation and could frustrate
national labor policy.2 41 The premise of the primary jurisdiction theory
is that Congress did more than merely create substantive regulation in
passing the NLRA: it also established a comprehensive regulatory mechanism for enforcing the rights and duties created. According to this the§ 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1982), prohibiting discipline of union members for exercising their rights
under the LMRDA.
237. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
"
shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land ..
238. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 292-93 (2d ed. 1983);
Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975).
239. 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959):
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a state purports to
regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair
labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield....
At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States
was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not
primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act
that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations
Board ....
...When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act: the States as well as
the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations
Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.
Recently, the Court has identified a second preemption principle, enunciated in IAM v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), which prohibits state regulation of conduct which Congress intended to remain unregulated. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles, 106 S. Ct. 1395, 1398 (1986); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). This preemption principle is not implicated in the current discussion.
240. See Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 295 & n.5 (1977); R.
GORMAN, supra note 36, at 767.
241. Farmer,430 U.S. at 295 n.5; A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW 895-96 (10th ed. 1986); R. GORMAN, supra note 36, at 767.
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ory, exclusive jurisdiction was vested in the NLRB in order to ensure
uniform application and interpretation of the national labor policy.2 42
The preemption issue arises in the current context because the political abuse of hiring halls, which is the subject of the LMRDA lawsuit,
also constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(1)(A) and section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. Since the preemption doctrine applies to federal as well as state courts,2 4 3 the question arises whether preemption by
the NLRA applies to claims raised under the LMRDA.
Initial guidance in answering this question was provided by the
Supreme Court in InternationalBrotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman.24 Hardeman, a member of the union, became involved in an altercation with the union business manager over what Hardeman perceived
to be unfair treatment in referrals from the hiring hall. Hardeman was
brought up on union charges of creating dissension within the union and
threatening a union officer. He was found guilty of the charges and expelled from the union. As a result of the expulsion he lost job opportunities and suffered a loss of income. Hardeman subsequently filed suit
under section 102 of the LMRDA alleging he had been disciplined without a fair hearing in violation of section 101(a)(5).2 45
The union claimed that Hardeman's complaint was preempted by
the NLRA, as he was seeking damages for discrimination in job referrals
which was arguably prohibited by section 8(b)(1)(A) and section 8(b)(2)
of the NLRA. The Court rejected the union's argument.2 46
The Court held that the primary jurisdiction theory is based on the
premise that in "cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional
experience of judges or ... requiring the exercise of administrative dis242. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244-45; Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403
U.S. 274, 287-89 (1971); A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 241, at 896; R. GORMAN, supra
note 36, at 767; Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered. The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72
COLUM. L. REV. 469 (1972).
Since the Supreme Court announced the Garmon rule, subsequent cases have been replete with
exceptions. Activity otherwise falling within the Garmon rule has been excepted from its application
because the activity in question was a matter of merely peripheral concern to the NLRA, IAM v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958) (expulsion from union membership); because it concerned issues
deeply rooted in local interests, see, e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966)
(libel); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (picket line violence); or because the injured party was
unable to bring the dispute before the NLRB, ILA v. Davis, 106 S. Ct. 1904, 1913 n. 10 (1986); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
For a more detailed analysis of the preemption doctrine see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337 (1972); Cox, Recent Developments in FederalLabor Law Preemption,
41 OHIO ST. L.J. 277 (1980); Lesnick, supra; Shultz & Husband, Federal Preemption Under the
NLRA: A Rule in Search of a Reason, 62 DEN. U.L. REV. 531 (1985).
243. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245; see also Etelson & Smith, supra note 172, at 754. Cf Smith v.
Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
244. 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
245. Id. at 235-37.
246. Id.
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cretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter
should not be passed over." 24' 7 However, the fairness of union disciplinary procedures is not beyond the competence of federal judges nor is it
within the special expertise of the NLRB. Moreover, Congress in enacting the LMRDA was aware that it was adding new rights and duties to
federal labor law and specifically entrusted enforcement of those rights to
federal district courts, not to the NLRB.248
As to the substantive rights theory of preemption, the Court found it
inapplicable also. This case did not involve an attempt to apply state
law, nor federal law of general application, but rather a federal law explicitly made applicable to the factual circumstances involved.24 9
In reaching its conclusion that the preemption doctrine did not apply to Hardeman's suit under the LMRDA, the Court cited with approval several circuit court decisions which had held that Congress by
enacting section 102 expressly provided for federal court enforcement of
the rights created by the LMRDA, and that section 103 clearly indicated
Congress' intent that these rights be superimposed on already existing
rights available in other fora.25 °
Although the specific facts of Hardeman involved a claim under section 101(a)(5), the rationale used by the Court to find preemption inapplicable is equally persuasive as to the entire LMRDA. Therefore, not
only claims raised under section 101(a)(5), but those raised under any
provision of the LMRDA should withstand the preemptive force of the
NLRA.2 5 '
As often noted by the Court in dealing with preemption issues, the
247. Id. at 238 (quoting Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676
(1965)).
248. Id. at 238-39.
249. Id. at 240-41. See Beaird & Player, supra note 172, at 384-88.
250. Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 241 n.6 (citing International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388
F.2d 193, 195-97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968) ("Even if the conduct is arguably
subject to the NLRA ... it is also a violation of the LMRDA ....
A clear Congressional directive
that federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits for damages has precedence over application of
the primary jurisdiction rule."); Rekant v. Shochtay-Gasos Union Local 446, 320 F.2d 271 (3d Cir.
1963) (§ 102 providing for federal enforcement of a union member's rights); Parks v. IBEW, 314
F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963) (§ 103 preserving all remedies under any law or
before any tribunal; district court not to abstain from exercising jurisdiction when issue arguably
subject to the NLRA); Addison v. Grand Lodge of the 1AM, 300 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1962)
("The [LMRDA] embodies a Bill of Rights of members of labor organizations, and for infringement
of its rights, the Act provides a federal forum."); Grand Lodge of the 1AM v. King, 335 F.2d 340,
347 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 920 (1964) ("Congress was aware that the rights conferred by
the [LMRDA] overlapped those available under state law and other federal legislation, and expressly
provided that these rights were to be cumulative.").
Section 103 of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1982), provides in pertinent part: "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization
under any State or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal ..
"
251. See generally Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current
Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1450-52 (1970); Etelson & Smith,
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touchstone is congressional intent.2 52 Congress, in various provisions
throughout the LMRDA, indicated its intent that causes of action under
the statute not be preempted. Congress expressly provided for individual
enforcement of Title I rights in federal court by enacting section 102. It
also specifically provided for the enforcement of Title V rights in section
501(b), and for the enforcement of section 609 rights by making the provisions of section 102 applicable to their enforcement.2 53 Similarly, as
section 103 evinces congressional intent that LMRDA remedies with respect to Title I be cumulative of all other available state or federal remedies,254 section 603 evinces that same intent with respect to all six titles of
the LMRDA.2 5 5
The rights being vindicated in an LMRDA action arise out of the
union member-union relationship. Violation of those rights might have a
corollary effect on the employer-employee relationship, 256 but the focus
of the LMRDA, and the court's analysis of a claim, remains the memberunion relation. The court will consider whether the union member's status as a member was affected, and whether the conduct is forbidden
under the LMRDA. This is a different focus and concern than that imsupra note 172, at 754-55. For present purposes, consideration of preemption will be limited to
claims raised under Title I, Title V and § 609.
Suits under the LMRDA which involve claims arising from the same core of facts as an unfair
labor practice under the NLRA are analogous to actions under § 301 and § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 187 (1982). Under § 301, an individual may
sue to redress a violation of the collective bargaining agreement even though the violation itself may
constitute an unfair labor practice. Like the LMRDA, § 301 has been held to confer substantive
rights upon employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement, and Congress directed the
courts to formulate and apply federal law to these suits. Therefore, Garmon does not preempt individual suits in federal court under § 301. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962). Similarly, the same conduct which constitutes an unfair labor practice under § 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, and
for which that Act provides an administrative remedy, also gives rise to a claim for damages cognizable in either state or federal court under § 303. Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258
n.13 (1964).
252. See Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 106 S. Ct.
1057, 1063 (1986); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985); Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
253. The court in Vandeventer v. IUOE Local 513, 579 F.2d 1373, 1377-78 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 984 (1978), examined the legislative history of both § 101 and § 609 and found that
it indicated congressional intent that union members have remedies before both the federal courts
and the NLRB.
254. See Parks, 314 F.2d at 922; Thatcher, Rights of Individual Union Members Under Title I
and Section 610 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 52 GEO. L.J. 339, 361 (1964).
255. 29 U.S.C. § 523 (1982) states, in pertinent part:
(a) ... except as explicitly provided to the contrary, nothing in this Act shall take away
any right or bar any remedy to which members of a labor organization are entitled under
such other Federal Law or law of any State.
(b) ... nor shall anything contained in said titles [I through VI] of this Act be construed
... to impair or otherwise affect the rights of any person under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
256. This corollary effect can occur when discipline of a member or infringement of a member's
rights takes the form of discrimination in job referrals resulting in loss of employment opportunities.
See supra text accompanying notes 133-213.
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plicated by the NLRA.2 7 The latter statute is concerned with regulating
the employer-employee relation by means of the employer-union relation.
The court in an LMRDA case is not being asked to adjudicate the legality of conduct as it applies to the employer-union relation governed by
the NLRA; rather it is determining the legality of a union's conduct as it
affects the members and the institution as a whole. If a union member's
Title I rights are infringed, or the member is disciplined for exercising
those rights, the federal court can determine these questions under the
LMRDA without considering the legality of such conduct under the
NLRA. The same is true when the court is asked to determine whether a
union officer has breached his fiduciary obligations to the union-there is
no need to consider the NLRA. No danger of inconsistent or conflicting
interpretations of the NLRA is present.
Therefore, neither of the rationales behind preemption theory is applicable to the LMRDA. As to the substantive right argument, the
LMRDA is a federal statute, enacted by a Congress fully cognizant of
the existence of the NLRA, which created new rights and regulated conduct not within the scope of the NLRA. Congress in section 103 and
section 603 plainly expressed its intent that any rights under the
LMRDA exist alongside all existing rights, including those under the
NLRA. As to the primary jurisdiction branch of the preemption doctrine, Congress in section 102 and section 501(b) clearly granted jurisdiction to the federal district courts to enforce the LMRDA. This
enforcement does not require any consideration of the terms of the
NLRA.
Courts presented with the preemption defense in LMRDA cases
since Hardeman have rejected it. Many of these cases involve section
101(a)(5), and are therefore directly governed by Hardeman.2 58 Various
cases, however, have dealt with other sections of the LMRDA.
In Benda v. GrandLodge of JAM,259 the preemption argument was
raised in the context of a Title III suit challenging the imposition of a
union trusteeship. 2" The court held that clear expressions of congres257. Accord New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979). The Court
held that a state unemployment compensation law authorizing payment of benefits to striking workers is not preempted by the NLRA. The purpose behind the state law is to provide for the public
welfare by insuring employment security, not to regulate the union-employer relation. "[T]he fact
that the implementation of this general state policy affects the relative strength of the antagonists in a
bargaining dispute is not a sufficient reason for concluding that Congress intended to pre-empt that
exercise of state power." Id. at 546.
258. See, e.g., Schmid v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 773 F.2d 993 (8th Cir. 1985); Vandeventer,
579 F.2d at 1373; Young v. International Ass'n of Heat Insulators, 112 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3288
(N.D. Ill. 1981), aff'd, 703 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1983); Hiura v. IBEW, Local 1186, 108 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2684 (D. Hawaii 1981).
259. 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 937 (1979).
260. Title III of the LMRDA regulates the imposition and administration of union trusteeships.
29 U.S.C. §§ 461-466 (1982). See generally J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 98-
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sional intent that federal courts exercise jurisdiction to enforce the
LMRDA take precedence over any claim of NLRB primary jurisdiction.2 6 1 In Quinn v. DiGiulian,262 the union allegedly disciplined, fined
and suspended from membership a union member because of his political
activity within the union, eventually leading to his discharge from his
job, in violation of sections 101(a)(1), (2) and (5) and section 609. The
court, relying on Hardeman and Benda, rejected the union's preemption
argument: a claim of illegal union disciplinary action is not preempted
merely because a consequence of the discipline is loss of employment.2 6 3
Although dealing specifically with a claim arising under section
101(a)(1), the court in Woods v. Local 613, IBEW,26 1 unequivocally held
that rights guaranteed under the LMRDA are not preempted by the
NLRA. This conclusion was based on two considerations. First, the
role of Garmon was to prevent conflict between state and federal policy.
The LMRDA is itself an expression of federal policy and Congress has
entrusted the courts, not the NLRB, with primary responsibility in enforcing that policy. Second, section 103 provides that the LMRDA is
cumulative of other rights, including those provided by the NLRA. 265 A
similar analysis led the court in Martin v. Flannery2 6 6 to find that plaintiff's section 101(a)(4) claim was not preempted. The court held that the
statutory scheme of the LMRDA precludes preemption as evidenced by
section 102, which explicitly vests jurisdiction in the federal courts. The
rationale for preemption is not applicable since the federal court bases its
decision on an independent federal law and is not required to interpret
the NLRA.2 67
Likewise claims of political abuse of hiring hall referrals based on
sections 101(a)(2) and (5), section 609 and section 501 of the LMRDA
are not preempted by the NLRA. Such claims find their basis apart from
150; Moss, Union Trusteeships: Title III of the Labor-ManagementReporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 4 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1 (1969); Note, Landrum-Griffin and the Trusteeship Imbroglio, 71
YALE L.J. 1460 (1962).
Benda, 584 F.2d at 313-14. The court stated:
In enacting the LMRDA the explicitly stated congressional purpose was to regulate internal union practices so as to protect the rights of individual union members. If Congress
had felt the National Labor Relations Board could adequately deal with these problems,
there would have been no need either to draft new substantive law or to create a new
jurisdictional avenue for resolving those disputes. Obviously, the doctrines of preemption
and primary jurisdiction must yield to the extent necessary to prevent frustration of con-

261.

gressional purposes as expressed in the LMRDA.
Id. at 314 n.2 (citation omitted).
262. 739 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
263. Id. at 643.
264. 404 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
265. Id. at 113-14.
266. Civ. No. 84-7606 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 10, 1985).
267. Accord Plant v. Local 199, Laborers, 324 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Del. 1971) (claims arising
under §§ 101(a)(2), (4) and (5) not preempted).

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:339

NLRA considerations, and on the independent federal policy to promote
union internal democracy.
2. Statute of Limitations
Neither section 102268 nor section 501(b) 2 69 contains an express limitations provision for the filing of enforcement actions. As different principles govern the determination of the appropriate limitations period for
these two provisions, they will be discussed separately.
a. Section 102
Where Congress creates a cause of action but does not provide a
limitations period, courts will often apply the most closely analogous
state statute of limitations of the forum state.27 0 These state limitations
periods will not be borrowed, however, if their application would be inconsistent with the underlying policies of the federal statute.2 7 Initially,
the federal courts followed this general rule and applied the most closely
analogous state limitations period to LMRDA suits.2 72 The Supreme
Court decision in DelCostello,27 3 however, caused many courts to reconsider the appropriateness of this course of action.
DelCostello involved a hybrid duty of fair representation/section
301274 lawsuit. The employee alleged that the employer had violated the
collective bargaining agreement, and that the union's handling of his
grievance protesting the contract violation constituted a breach of its
the approduty to fairly represent him. The Court was asked to decide
275
priate statute of limitations applicable to such hybrid suits.
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the general rule of borrowing analogous state statutes. It then noted that in some instances the
state statutory periods may act to frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies, in which case the Court will look to federal law for an appropriate limitations period. Having stated the rule
268. Section
269. Section
under § 501(a).
270. Wilson
U.S. 151 (1983);

102 governs enforcement of suits alleging violations of Title I and § 609.
50 1(b) is the enforcement provision for actions alleging breach of fiduciary duties
v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462
Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610

(1895).
271. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984); DelCostello,
462 U.S. at 151; Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977).
272. See, e.g., Copitas v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 618 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1980) (applying
California three-year limitation period for causes of action upon liability created by statute); Howard
v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 589 F.2d 771 (4th Cir. 1978) (applying Virginia two-year limitation period for tort); Sewell v. Grand Lodge of IAM, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1024 (1972) (applying Alabama one-year limitation period for injury to personal rights).
273. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 151.
274. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
275. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 154-58.
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and its exception, the Court proceeded to discuss its decision in UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal,276 which had followed the general rule, and distin27 7
guished it from the facts presented by DelCostello.
The Court noted that Hoosier Cardinal"was a straightforward suit
under section 301" for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, filed
by the union against the employer. While recognizing that the field of
labor law ordinarily calls for national uniformity, the Court reasoned
that uniformity was less important in cases not involving the formation
of collective bargaining agreements or the private settlement of disputes
under such agreements. The Court also observed the close analogy between section 301 suits and breach of contract cases. It was, therefore,
appropriate to apply the state limitations period for actions on unwritten
contracts.2 78
The DelCostello case, on the other hand, involved a suit filed by an
employee challenging the private settlement of a dispute under a collective bargaining agreement. Such a suit, involving as it does a hybrid of
claims-one against the employer and one against the union-has no
close analogy in ordinary state law. Rather, it bears a resemblance to
unfair labor practice charges alleging breach of the duty of fair representation under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, and breach of the duty to
bargain under section 8(a)(5). 27 9 Moreover, the policy considerations underlying the six-month limitation period for unfair labor practices in section 10(b) of the NLRA are similar to those involved in a hybrid case:
"the proper balance between the natural interests in stable bargaining
relationships and the finality of private settlements, and an employee's
interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the
collective-bargaining agreement. '2 80 Thus, the six-month section 10(b)
period was held to govern such claims.
The Court concluded its decision by cautioning that it was not departing from the general rule of borrowing state statutes and counseled
courts to continue to use a flexible approach in determining a limitations
period.28 1
Subsequently, several circuit and district courts have applied the
holding of DelCostello to LMRDA cases.2 8 2 The most extensive rationale given for applying DelCostello is found in the Third Circuit's decision
276.
277.
278.

UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 158-62.
Id. at 162-63.

279.

Id. at 163-70.

280. Id. at 171.
281. Id. at 171-72.
282. Davis v. UAW, 765 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1284 (1986); Vallone v. Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam); Adkins v.
IUE, 769 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1984); Local 1397, USWA v. United Steelworkers of Am., 748 F.2d 180
(3d Cir. 1984); McConnell v. Chauffeurs Local 445, 606 F. Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Legutko v.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:339

in Local 1397, USWA v. United Steelworkers of America.2 83 This case
involved a section 102 suit alleging violations of sections 101(a)(2) and
(5) and section 609 of the LMRDA. The court found a resemblance
between unfair labor practice charges and section 102 suits-both section
8(b)(1) and section 102 address the same basic concern of protecting
workers from arbitrary union actions. The court argued that any attempted distinction between the internal concerns of the LMRDA and
the external concerns of the NLRA is flawed; the union has one function,
which is to represent workers in bargaining with employers.28 4 Secondly,
the court found the policy considerations favoring rapid resolution of
bargaining disputes in order to maintain stability in bargaining relationships to apply as well to LMRDA suits, noting that dissension within the
union impacts on the union's effectiveness in collective bargaining with
employers. 28 5 Therefore the court applied the six-month limitation period provided in section 10(b) of the NLRA.
The Eleventh Circuit in Davis v. UAW 286 agreed that there was a
resemblance between alleged violation of Title I rights and unfair labor
practice charges as noted by the Third Circuit. It disagreed, however,
with the Third Circuit's analysis of the policy considerations. The court
found an important distinction between Title I actions, which implicate
national interests in union democracy and involve only the union and its
members, and DelCostello hybrid claims, which involve the employer and
the bargaining relationship and implicate only individual employee interests.28 7 Moreover, it thought the link between internal union dissension
and the union's effectiveness in bargaining, noted by the Third Circuit, to
be rather tenuous. 2 88 Nevertheless, the court felt "constrained by the
rationale of DelCostello and the holding of our sister circuits to reach the
same conclusion," and applied the section 10(b) statute of limitations.28 9
Recently courts have shown a reluctance to automatically apply the
holding of DelCostello and have found the policy considerations underlying that case to be inapplicable to LMRDA suits. 29 ° These cases repre-

sent a better balancing of interests and more appropriate analysis of the
Local 816, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 606 F. Supp. 352 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Turco v. Local Lodge 5, Int'l
Bhd. of Boilermakers, 592 F. Supp. 1293 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
283. 748 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1984).
284. Id. at 183-84.

285. Id.
286. 765 F.2d 1510 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1284 (1986).
287. Id. at 1514.
288. Id. at 1514 n.ll.
289. Id. at 1514.
290. Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986); Reed v. United Transp. Union, 633 F. Supp.
1516 (W.D.N.C. 1986); McQueen v. Maguire, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2449 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Rector
v. Local 10, Int'l Union of Elevator Constrs., 625 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1985); Rodonich v. House
Wreckers Union Local 95, 624 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Testa v. Gallagher, 621 F. Supp. 476
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Bernard v. Delivery Drivers, 587 F. Supp. 524 (D. Colo. 1984).
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issues than the earlier court decisions. In thorough and well reasoned
opinions these courts have thoughtfully criticized prior cases applying
DelCostello and explained the distinctions between LMRDA and hybrid
suits.
Although there may be a surface similarity between claims under
the NLRA and the LMRDA, the focus of these statutes differs. The
NLRA secures worker economic rights gained through collective bargaining whereas the LMRDA regulates internal union affairs and secures
worker civil rights from union abuses.29 1 The Third Circuit's view of a
union's function is too narrow: unions not only engage in collective bargaining, but offer employees the opportunity to participate in decisions
that affect their working lives. "Participation has an independent value
of its own; the LMRDA protects rights of participation." 29' 2
LMRDA claims do not implicate the employer nor do they have
any immediate or direct impact on the bargaining relationship or agreement. Any effect on the contractual concerns involved in DelCostello is
tangential at best.293 Even where LMRDA claims implicate employment
issues, these issues are not the focus of the claims. Rather, employment
issues are implicated as a consequence of the union's illegal actions toward its members.

29 4

Finally, unlike hybrid claims which find no easy analog in state law,
LMRDA claims are similar to state claims. Title I establishes a "bill of
rights" similar to that found in the Constitution, 29 5 and section 102 seeks

to protect those civil and political rights from infringement by union government. As such, a claim under Title I closely resembles a civil rights
claim. 296 The Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia characterized a federal
civil rights claim as a personal injury action for purposes of determining
291.

Doty, 784 F.2d at 3-4.

292.

Rector, 625 F. Supp. at 178.

293. Doty, 784 F.2d at 7; Rector, 625 F. Supp. at 178; Rodonich, 624 F. Supp. at 682; Testa, 621
F. Supp. at 479.
294. Accord McQueen v. Maguire, 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2449 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), which alleged a
violation of § 101 as a result of the union's refusal to refer certain members from the hiring hall
because they had participated in a Title VII lawsuit against the union. "Although I recognize that
this action presents a challenge to the union's management of a collectively bargained hiring hall
referral system, resolution of plaintiff's claims will have insufficient impact on the collective bargaining process to justify application of § 10(b)." Id. at 2453.
As the First Circuit specifically pointed out in Doty, those LMRDA cases which are appended
to hybrid § 301/fair representation claims and basically involve challenges to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or settlement thereunder may appropriately be governed by DelCostello.
Doty, 784 F.2d at 4. See also Linder v. Berge, 739 F.2d 686 (1st Cir. 1984); Adkins v. IUE, 769 F.2d
330 (6th Cir. 1984).
295. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at 109-12.
296. Doty, 784 F.2d at 6, 11; Reed v. United Transp. Union, 633 F. Supp. 1516 (W.D.N.C.
1986); McQueen, 122 L.R.R.M. at 2454; Rodonich, 624 F. Supp. at 681; Testa, 621 F. Supp. at 479.
Contra Rector, 625 F. Supp. at 179 (LMRDA claim resembles contract action).
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the appropriate state statute of limitations.2 97 It is appropriate, therefore, to apply the personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state
to claims arising under Title I of the LMRDA.298
b.

Section 501(b)

As discussed earlier, the fiduciary principles contained in section
501 are based on the common law.2 99 Traditionally, the liability of a
trustee who breached her fiduciary obligations sounded in equity. 3° ° Accordingly, actions brought under section 501 have been considered equitable rather than legal in nature.3 ° '
In the absence of an express statute of limitations, the court of equity fashions its own time limitation under the principle of laches.3 °2
Therefore, suits filed under section 501 are governed by the doctrine of
laches.3 ° 3 Whether a court, in its discretion, will invoke the doctrine of
laches does not depend on the length of time since the cause of action
arose, but whether, under the circumstances presented, the plaintiff's delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting his claim has caused prejudice to
the defendant. 3°
In sum, for purposes of the statute of limitations on LMRDA
claims, courts should borrow the forum state limitations period for personal injury actions in suits brought under section 102, and should apply
the doctrine of laches to suits brought under section 501(b).
3.

Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies

The doctrine withholding judicial relief for an alleged injury until
the prescribed internal remedies have been exhausted has been applied
not only in the field of administrative law 30 5 but also to the activities of
private associations. 30 6 As private associations, unions have received the
297. 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985) (claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
298. See cases cited supra note 296.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 214-21.
300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959).
301. See, e.g., Erkins v. Bryan, 785 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 455 (1986);
Local 92, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge Workers v. Norris, 383 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1967); Morrissey v. Curran, 482 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in pertinent part, 650 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1981);
Yablonski v. UMW, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2594 (D.D.C. 1971).
302. Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 287 (1940); International Tel. and Tel. Corp. v. General Tel.
& Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913, 926 (9th Cir. 1975); see P. BAKER & P. LANGAN, SNELL'S PRINCIPLES
OF EQUITY 34-37 (28th ed. 1982).
303. Erkins v. Bryan, 785 F.2d at 1542-43; Morrissey v. Curran, 482 F. Supp. at 40.
304. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. at 287;
Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1980); P. BAKER & P.
LANGAN, supra note 302, at 36.
305. See, e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 382-95 (3d ed. 1972).
306. See, e.g., Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp., 79 N.J. 549, 401 A.2d 533 (1979) (hospital);
Gashgai v. Maine Medical Ass'n, 350 A.2d 571 (Me. 1976) (medical association); Parish v. Mary-

1987]

HIRING HALL ABUSE

benefit of this doctrine.3 °7 The purposes served by the exhaustion requirement are conservation of judicial resources and preservation of institutional autonomy.30 8
a. Section 101(a)(4)
Section 101(a)(4) of the LMRDA provides that a member may be
required to exhaust intraunion procedures (not to exceed four months)
before instituting legal action against the union. 30 9 This provision has
been interpreted as incorporating the exhaustion principle into the
LMRDA.3" ° This principle, however, is not mandatory-it does not act
as a jurisdictional bar to judicial relief. Rather it commits to the discretion of the court the decision whether a union member will be required to
exhaust the available union remedies prior to resorting to the court under
section 102.3"1

Although a court's decision on whether to require exhaustion depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case,31 2 there are several
well established exceptions to the general principle of exhaustion.31 3 Exhaustion will not be required if there is no likelihood that the union will
render a decision within four months, 314 if the remedies available
land and Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968) (corporation); Annotation, Suspension or Expulsion from Social Club or Similar Society and the Remedies Therefor, 20
A.L.R.2d 344, 385-87 (1951); Annotation, Suspension or Expulsionfrom ProfessionalAssociation and
the Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 421, 486-87 (1951); Annotation, Suspension or Expulsion from
Church or Religious Society and the Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d 531, 564-65 (1951). See Note,
Developments in the Law-JudicialControl ofActions of PrivateAssociations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983,
1069-80 (1963) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Comment, Exhaustion ofRemedies in Private,
Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L.J. 369 (1956) [hereinafter Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies].
307. See, e.g., Rensch v. General Drivers, Local 120, 268 Minn. 307, 129 N.W.2d 341 (1964);
Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMWA, 400 Pa. 145, 161 A.2d 882 (1960); Local 4, Nat'l Org. of Masters v.
Brown, 258 Ala. 18, 61 So. 2d 93 (1952). See Vorenberg, Exhaustion of Intraunion Remedies, 2
LAB. L.J. 487 (1951).
308. McKart, 395 U.S. at 194-95; Detroy v. American Guild of Variety Artists, 286 F.2d 74, 79
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); Developments in the Law, supra note 306, at 1070-71;
Comment, Exhaustion of Remedies, supra note 306, at 375-76.
309. LMRDA § 101(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1982), states, in pertinent part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in
any court . . . Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable
hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organization. ...
310. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1968); Libutti v.
DiBrizzi, 337 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd on rehearing, 343 F.2d 460 (1965).
311. See, e.g., IndustrialUnion, 391 U.S. at 427-28; Fulton Lodge 2, IAM v. Nix, 415 F.2d 212,
216 (5th Cir. 1969); Detroy, 286 F.2d at 78; Maier v. Patterson, 511 F. Supp. 436, 439-40 (E.D. Pa.
1981); Beaird & Player, Exhaustion of Intra-UnionRemedies and Access to Public Tribunals Under
the Landrum-Griffin Act, 26 ALA. L. REV. 519, 529-30 (1974).
312. Industrial Union, 391 U.S. at 427-28.
313. See J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 58-63; Beaird & Player, supra note
311, at 530-39.
314. Rosario v. Dolgen, 441 F. Supp. 657, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in pertinentpart sub nom.
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through the union are inadequate,3 15 if no appeal procedures are available,31 6 if appeal would be futile,3 17 or if the union's action is void ab
initio.3 18
In any event, even when a court requires an individual to resort to
internal union procedures, "exhaustion" in the sense of pursuing those
procedures to their final conclusion will never be required. As mandated
by section 101(a)(4), pursuit of union remedies past a four month period
will not be required.31 9 Thus, prior to filing a suit under section 102, a
union member may be required to some extent to utilize the union's internal grievance procedure to seek redress for his injury.
b.

Section 501(b)

Section 501(b) contains its own specific prerequisites to filing suit:
failure of the union to institute its own suit upon demand by the member,
and leave of court to file complaint by filing verified application upon
good cause shown. Before discussing these prerequisites, an initial question presents itself-must the union member exhaust her internal procedures pursuant to section 101(a)(4) as well as meeting the specific
prerequisites of section 501(b), or were the latter procedures enacted to
replace the exhaustion principle contained in section 101(a)(4)? Case law
is split on this question. The more recent and persuasive authority, however, views the requirements of section 501(b) as a substitute for those
found in section 101(a)(4).
The most extensive analysis finding both exhaustion and compliance
with section 501(b) as prerequisites to filing suit is contained in Penuelas
v. Moreno.3 2 ° There the court initially noted that since federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction, statutes conferring such jurisdiction should
be strictly construed. In line with this concept of strict construction, the
court found no indication that exhaustion under section 101(a)(4) is not
applicable to section 501. Moreover, according to the court, Congress
clearly expressed its intent not to abrogate the exhaustion doctrine, and
the policies which underlie that doctrine apply with equal force to section
501. Lastly, the court held that the "good cause" requirement of section
501(b) invites reference to the exhaustion doctrine, reasoning that a
plaintiff who has not exhausted internal union remedies lacks good cause
to file suit in court.32 1
Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, 605 F.2d 1228 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
315. Rupe v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 679 F.2d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1982).
316. Vandeventer, 579 F.2d at 1379.
317. Keene v. IUOE, Local 624, 569 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir. 1978).
318. Keeffe Bros. v. Teamsters, Local 592, 562 F.2d 298, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1977).
319. See Beaird & Player, supra note 311, at 530-31 and cases cited therein.
320. 198 F. Supp. 441 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
321. Id. at 444-49. Accord Jennings v. Carey, 57 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2635 (D.D.C. 1964); Moss v.
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The Penuelas decision has been criticized by courts and commentators alike.3 22 The fact that Congress specifically referred to exhausting
union procedures in section 101(a)(4) while in the same enactment providing different prerequisites for suit in section 501(b) indicates an intent
to omit the exhaustion principle in section 501 suits.32 3 It should also be
noted that Congress explicitly referred to intraunion exhaustion requirements not only in section 101(a)(4) but also in Title IV, 3 2 4 which governs
election procedures.3 25 Before a union member may file a complaint with
the Secretary of Labor challenging a union election, she must first exhaust her available union remedies.3 26 This indicates that when Congress
wanted to require exhaustion it knew how to say so.
In section 501(b) Congress imposed a requirement of demand and
refusal as the means to alert the union to the problem and allow it the
opportunity to correct the situation, thus serving the policy of institutional autonomy. The good cause requirement acts to advance the interest in preservation of judicial resources. Thus the policy considerations
underlying the exhaustion principle are fulfilled by the preconditions
contained in section 501(b), so that superimposing the exhaustion doctrine contained in section 101(a)(4) would be redundant.
In any event, as it would be highly unlikely that a suit alleging political abuse of the hiring hall would be brought solely under section 501(a)
without a companion allegation under Title I, the union member should
have already complied, as necessary, with the exhaustion requirement of
section 101(a)(4).
An issue separate and distinct from exhaustion is compliance with
the stated prerequisites to a section 501 suit: demand and refusal, verified application and good cause. Initially the union member must make a
demand to the union that it sue to secure appropriate relief for the breach
of fiduciary duty, and allow the union a reasonable time to comply with
the request. 27 Some courts have strictly construed this requirement,
Davis, 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2081 (M.D. Fla. 1963); Echols v. Cook, 56 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3030
(N.D. Ga. 1962); all of which cite to Penuelas and contain no independent analysis of the issue.
322. See, e.g., Purcell v. Keane,.406 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1969); Frantz v. Sheet Metal Workers
Local 73, 470 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. 11. 1979); Holdeman v. Sheldon, 204 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 311 F.2d 2 (2d Cir. 1962); Clark, supra note 215, at 467-86; Note, Rights of Union Members:
The Developing Law Under the LMRDA, 48 VA. L. REV. 78-93 (1962); accord Persico v. Daley, 239
F. Supp. 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
323. Holdeman, 204 F. Supp. at 896.
324. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-484 (1982).
325. Purcell, 406 F.2d at 1199.
326. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a) (1982).
327. The statute does not define what period of time is reasonable; at least one commentator has
suggested between three to six months, depending on the circumstances involved. Clark, supra note
215, at 463-64.
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finding failure to make the demand cause for dismissing the complaint. a28
Other courts have been more liberal and have excused failure to make a
demand where it would be futile.32 9 In view of the purpose served by
requiring the demand-preservation of institutional autonomy by allowing the union an initial opportunity to deal with all problems-it
makes little sense to require such an act where it is clear that the union
does not intend to handle the problem. As with the exhaustion principle
embodied in section 101(a)(4), it should be within the court's discretion
to excuse compliance when the purpose behind the requirement would
not be served.
After demand and refusal, the union member must file a verified
application seeking leave of the court to file a complaint upon good cause
shown. The purpose served by this requirement is to protect union officials from vexatious and harassing lawsuits. 330 The courts have not been
rigidly formalistic with regard to the procedure used to obtain the court's
permission to file a complaint. Permission has been granted after the
complaint was filed, where the complaint itself was verified and the complaint contained a request to file suit or counsel moved for leave to
proceed.33 '
The meaning of "good cause" in this context was definitively established by the court in Dinko v. Wall, where the court construed good
cause "to mean that plaintiff must show a reasonable likelihood of success and, with regard to any material facts he alleges, must have a reasonable ground for belief in their existence. ' ' 332 In determining whether
such good cause exists, the court is not limited to the face of the complaint, but may take into account all the facts and circumstances, including exhibits and affidavits. 333 This determination may be made ex parte,
328. Flaherty v. Warehousemen, Local 334, 574 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978); Coleman v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 340 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1965).
329. McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976);
Sabolsky v. Budzanoski, 457 F.2d 1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 853 (1972).
330. See, e.g., Dinko v. Wall, 531 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1976); Local 314, Nat'l Post Office Mail
Handlers v. National Post Office Mail Handlers, 572 F. Supp. 133, 138 (E.D. Mo. 1983); J. BELLACE
& A. BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 303; Comment, FiduciaryDuties of Union Officers, supra note
223, at 893.
331. See, e.g., Sabolsky, 457 F.2d at 1249-50; Homer v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir.),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); Pawlak v. Greenawalt, 464 F. Supp. 1265, 1268-69 (M.D. Pa.
1979); Brink v. DaLesio, 453 F. Supp. 272, 276 (D. Md. 1978); Executive Bd., Local 28, IBEW v.
IBEW, 184 F. Supp. 649 (D. Md. 1960). Contra Adams v. Rear, 424 F. Supp. 1115 (W.D. Okla.
1976) (request to file suit contained in complaint does not conform to statutory requirement that
leave be obtained before commencing suit).
332. 531 F.2d at 75. Accord Local 314, Mail Handlers, 572 F. Supp. at 139; Frantz, 470 F.
Supp. at 228. See J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 303; Clark, supra note 215, at
465-66; Comment, Fiduciary Duties of Union Officers, supra note 223, at 893.
333. Dinko, 531 F.2d at 74-75; Homer, 362 F.2d at 229; Local 314, Mail Handlers, 572 F. Supp.
at 139; Frantz, 470 F. Supp. at 228-29.
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or on the basis of a hearing.334
4.

Remedies
a.

Section 102

Section 102 provides for the granting of "appropriate" relief, including injunctions. In a case alleging political abuse of the hiring hall such
appropriate relief may include compensatory and punitive damages as
well as injunctive relief.
(1)

Compensatory Damages

The standard generally used by the courts in determining the appropriateness of awarding compensatory damages allows recovery for those
injuries suffered as a proximate result of the wrongful union conduct.33 5
The union member subjected to discriminatory referral practices will suffer a decrease in, or total loss of, employment income and related fringe
benefits, such as contributions to health, welfare and pension funds.
Such losses, which are the direct result of the union's unlawful conduct,
are clearly recoverable.3 36 Other nonmonetary injuries caused by the
union's conduct are also compensable, such as injury to reputation, loss
of sleep, and physical illness (headaches, palpitations, weight gain or
loss). 3 37 The courts are not in agreement as to whether mental suffering
or emotional distress alone is compensable.3 3 8
(2) Punitive Damages
There is also some question as to the award of punitive damages
under the LMRDA. Those circuit courts which have considered the issue have unanimously held that punitive damages may be awarded where
334. Homer, 362 F.2d at 228-29: "Thus section 501(b) provides that such an application may be
made ex parte. But the court may, on its own motion, call for a hearing, or may grant the defendant's motion for a hearing."
335. See, e.g., Bise v. IBEW, 618 F.2d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904
(1980); Braswell, 388 F.2d at 199; Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir.
1965); Murphy, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2131. See Etelson & Smith, supra note 172, at 769.
336. See, e.g., Rosario v. Garment Cutters, 605 F.2d at 1245; Bise, 618 F.2d at 1305; Keene, 569
F.2d at 1382; Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers, 473 F.2d at 364; Braswell, 388 F.2d at 199;
Murphy, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2133; Sweeney v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 78 Lab. Cas. (CCH)
11,348 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Sands v. Abelli, 290 F. Supp. 677, 681-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
337. See, e.g., Rosario v. Garment Cutters, 605 F.2d at 1245; Bise, 618 F.2d at 1305; Simmons,
350 F.2d at 1019.
338. Compare International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 315 (9th Cir. 1965)
(apparently construing the term "appropriate relief" in § 102 as referring to equitable rather than
legal remedies, although refusing to fashion any general rule with regard to recovery while merely
disallowing claims for emotional distress alone) with Bradford v. Textile Workers, Local 1093, 563
F.2d 1138, 1144 (4th Cir. 1977) (allowing damages for mental suffering and humiliation) and Rosario v. Garment Cutters, 605 F.2d at 1245 ("Although a question may exist as to whether damages
are recoverable for mental or emotional distress ... in the absence of some other form of harm...
we need not ...

decide that issue in this case.").
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the union acts with actual malice or reckless and wanton indifference to
the rights of the injured member. 339 The rationale behind these decisions
was best expressed by the court in InternationalBrotherhood of Boilermakers v. Braswell.3" The court initially considered the purposes behind
the LMRDA, one of which is to prevent improper practices on the part
of labor unions. The court found that this deterrent purpose is served by
the award of punitive damages. 34' Next, the court looked at how the
state courts had handled the issue prior to the passage of the LMRDA.
The court found persuasive the logic of the New York state court upholding punitive damages on policy grounds:
The very basis for the existence of unionism in our society today is the
promise of employment to those who desire to associate freely in order to
obtain it .... When that right of free association is usurped by a concerted, malicious effort to deprive the individual of the safeguards built
into the organization, it cannot be condoned.34 2
The general consensus on this issue has been called into doubt by
the Supreme Court's opinion in IBEW v. Foust.343 The case involved a
union member's claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation by the way it handled his grievance. The sole issue before the Court
was whether an award of punitive damages is proper in such a case. 3 " In
determining that punitive damages are improper, the Court based its decision on four factors. First, the purpose behind fair representation suits
is to make the injured party whole, while punitive damages go beyond
compensating for the injury suffered.34 5 Second, limiting union liability
''reflects an attempt to afford individual employees redress for injuries
caused by union misconduct without compromising the collective interest of union members in protecting limited funds. ' 34 6 Awards of punitive
damages could deplete union treasuries, weakening the effectiveness of
the union. This concern is particularly appropriate in light of jury discretion in determining the award amount, which can be employed to
punish unpopular defendants such as unions.347 Third, the possibility of
punitive damages could act to curtail the broad discretion given to un339. Braswell, 388 F.2d at 199-200; Vandeventer, 579 F.2d at 1379-80; Bradford, 563 F.2d at
1144; Morrissey, 544 F.2d at 24-25; Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters, 529 F.2d 815,
820 (9th Cir. 1976). But cf. McCraw v. United Ass'n of Journeymen of the Plumbing Indus., 341
F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1965) (actions under § 101 essentially equitable in nature, suggesting punitive
damages unavailable).
340. 388 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968).
341. Id. at 200.
342. Id. (quoting Fittipaldi v. Legassie, 18 A.D.2d 331, 335, 239 N.Y.S.2d 792, 796 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1963)).
343. 442 U.S. 42 (1979).
344. Id. at 43-46.
345. Id. at 48-50.
346. Id. at 50.
347. Id. at 50-51 & n.14.
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ions in the handling of grievances. This could result in disrupting the
stability of collective bargaining agreements as unions might feel compelled to process every grievance, however frivolous.34 8 Fourth, "general
labor policy disfavors punishment," 34 9 and is essentially remedial in
nature.
The Court emphasized that it was expressing no views as to the propriety of punitive awards under the LMRDA.35 ° As recognized by Justice Blackmun in his opinion concurring in the result, some of the factors
relied on by the Court apply with equal force to suits under the
LMRDA.3 5 '
The inherent tension between individual and collective interests in
fair representation suits, usually involving individual grievances arising
under the contract, will normally not be present in a suit under the
LMRDA. In the latter case the individual interest in protecting her
political rights coincides with the group interest in a democratically run
organization. However, there is a collective interest in maintaining the
effectiveness of the union, which means having the financial resources to
support a strike fund, pay for arbitration and attorneys, and maintain
support staff and personnel necessary to negotiate and administer contracts. A large punitive damage award could cripple, if not bankrupt, a
local union's treasury.
This problem may be alleviated by several measures short of a complete prohibition on punitive damages. First, liability for punitive damages could be limited to union officers personally.35 2 Deprivations of
member rights normally occur for the purpose of advancing individual
officers' personal or political interests and not for the good of the organization. It does not seem just to punish the institution for the misdeeds of
the officers in such a case.35 3 Second, courts have the discretion to adjust
an award of punitive damages that is excessive under the circumstances,
which include the losing party's financial situation.3 54 Third, the imposition of punitive damages should be reserved for only the most egregious
cases, where the conduct of the union or its officers is the result of actual
malice.35 5
The other factor mentioned by the Foust Court that is applicable to
348. Id. at 51.
349. Id. at 52.
350.

Id. at 47 n.9.

351. Id. at 59.
352. As will be discussed infra text accompanying notes 369-73, individuals who abuse their
authority as union officials are personally liable for damages resulting from violation of member
rights.
353. See Etelson & Smith, supra note 172, at 770.
354. Accord Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 9 n.13; DiGiulian, 739 F.2d at 651 & n.22; Murphy, 774
F.2d at 134-35.
355. Accord DiGiulian,739 F.2d at 651. This standard is somewhat stricter than that previously
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LMRDA suits is the essentially remedial character of the national labor
laws. Almost all federal labor laws are limited to compensatory remedies. 56 There are a few instances, however, where Congress has provided for damages over and above those necessary to compensate the
plaintiff. The Fair Labor Standards Act provides for an award of liqui3 57
dated damages in an amount up to the amount of wages recovered.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act provides for liquidated
damages where violations are willful.3" 8 The issue, then, is the intent of
Congress with respect to punitive damages under the LMRDA.
Nothing in the legislative history expressly authorizes or precludes
punitive damages,3 59 although several statements indicate that Congress
did not intend the LMRDA to be punitive in nature. The Senate Report
on S.B. 1555, which at this time did not contain a "Bill of Rights" Title I,
noted that "[tihe committee rejects the notion of applying destructive
sanctions to a union. . ..

""

In support of the substitute bill which he

cosponsored, Representative Griffin made the following remarks: "The
substitute introduced today is a moderate but effective reform bill. It is
not punitive or extreme.""3 6 But neither of these comments was directed
specifically at the enforcement provisions of Title I, and they are much
too general in nature to be conclusive of the issue.
On the other hand, Congress did clearly express its intent that union
members retain all rights and remedies which they enjoyed under state
law.36 2 One of those state remedies, as noted by the Braswell court,36 3
approved in LMRDA cases. The prior standard allows punitive damages where defendant acts with
reckless or wanton indifference as well as maliciously. See supra text accompanying note 339.
This limitation on punitive damages is appropriate not only where liability is imposed on the
union itself but also where it is imposed solely on the offending officer. The rationale for limiting it

where unions are liable-the necessity for preserving the fiscal integrity of the union treasury-has
been discussed in the text. The limitation on officer liability is based on the reality of union compensation. Particularly on the local level, union officers are paid little or, in some circumstances, not at
all. If these individuals were held personally liable for punitive damages, other than for actual malice, it could reduce the pool of people willing to hold union office. This too would weaken a union's

effectiveness.
356.

See, e.g., Foust, 442 U.S. at 42 (union not liable for punitive damages for breach of duty of

fair representation); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (Title VII); Teamsters v.
Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (employer's damages under § 303 limited to actual losses); Republic
Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940) (NLRB cannot impose punitive sanctions for unfair labor
practices).
357. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). This provision is not penal in nature, but represents compensation for damages suffered which are too difficult to prove. Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S.
697, 707 (1945).
358. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982). This provision was intended to be punitive in nature. Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
359. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d at 648-49; Bise, 618 F.2d at 1305 n.6.
360. I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 152, at 403.
361. II LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LMRDA, supra note 152, at 1519.
362. 29 U.S.C. § 413 (1982). For text of this statutory provision see supra note 250.
363. 388 F.2d at 200. See supra text accompanying note 342.
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was the award of punitive damages to plaintiffs where union officials maliciously deprive them of their rights. 3" The possibility of punitive damages in these situations did not seem to overly concern Congress. The
Supreme Court, in considering the legislative history of section 102 in
Hall v. Cole, found congressional intent "to afford the courts 'a wide
latitude to grant relief according to the necessities of the case.' "365 Finally, punitive damages would clearly serve the congressional purpose to
"prevent improper practices on the part of labor organizations. "366
The balance between maintaining the effectiveness of the union as an
institution and protecting the rights of union members could perhaps
best be struck by allowing punitive damages to be awarded only against
individual union officers, and only when their conduct rises to the level of
actual malice.36 7
With respect to the individual liability of union officers for damages,
section 102 does not create a cause of action against individual officers
who commit tortious acts in their private capacities. 368 The courts are
unanimous, however, in holding union officers personally liable for acts
performed under color of, and in abuse of, their authority as union officials.36 9 Such individual liability is necessary to achieve one of the purposes behind the LMRDA-"to curb the power of overweening union
officials. ' ' 370 Liability is present not only where the individual officer
abuses his official authority to deny a member her rights under the
LMRDA, but also where he uses his authority to direct or induce others
to do so. 3 71 Of course, officials who act in a good faith effort to discharge
their official duties have a defense to the imposition of personal
372
liability.
364. See, e.g., Harper v. Gribble, 143 Colo. 502, 355 P.2d 526 (1960); Taxicab Drivers' Local

899 v. Pittman, 322 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1957); Manning v. Kennedy, 320 Ill. App. 11, 49 N.E.2d 658
(1943).
365. 412 U.S. at 13 (quoting Rep. Elliott).
366. 29 U.S.C. § 401(c) (1982).
367. Those courts which have considered the award of punitive damages since Foust have continued to find them appropriate in LMRDA suits. They have not, however, limited damages in the
manner here suggested. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d at 648-52; Parker v. Local 1466, USWA, 642 F.2d 104,
107 (5th Cir. 1981); Bise, 618 F.2d at 1305-06.
368. Tomko v. Hilbert, 288 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1961).
369. Rosario v. Garment Cutters, 605 F.2d at 1246; Keene, 569 F.2d at 1381; Morrissey, 544
1980); Sipe v. Local
F.2d at 24; Maxwell v. UAW, Local 1306, 489 F. Supp. 745, 750-51 (C.D. I11.
19, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 393 F. Supp. 865, 872 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Vincent v. Plumbers, Local
198, 384 F. Supp. 1379, 1384 (M.D. La. 1974); Eisman v. Baltimore Regional Joint Bd. of the
ACWU, 352 F. Supp. 429, 437 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd, 496 F.2d 1313 (4th Cir. 1974); accordAguirre,
633 F.2d at 172.
370. Rosario v. Garment Cutters, 605 F.2d at 1246; Morrissey, 544 F.2d at 24.
371. Rosario v. Garment Cutters, 605 F.2d at 1246; Gordon v. Winpisinger, 581 F. Supp. 234,
240 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
372. Keene, 569 F.2d at 1381 n.7; Morrissey, 544 F.2d at 24; White v. King, 319 F. Supp. 122,
126 (E.D. La. 1970).
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Union officers with authority to operate the hiring hall system, who
use that authority to discriminate against members who assert their political rights under the LMRDA, are abusing their positions and are personally liable for the damages caused. Even if the officer herself is not
responsible for making referrals, but only uses her authority as a union
the referrals to discrimiofficial to persuade the person who does make
37 3
nate, she can still be held personally liable.
(3)

Injunctive Relief

Section 102 specifically provides for the grant of injunctive relief. In
a case involving political abuse of the hiring hall, an injunction would
require restoring the plaintiff's name to its proper place on the referral
list, enjoining the union and its officers from discriminating against the
plaintiff in future referrals, and imposing a method of validating the referral practices to ensure against future discrimination.3 74 In addition to
the grant of permanent injunctive relief after the trial, section 102 also
allows for the grant of preliminary injunctive relief where appropriate.3 75
The grant of a preliminary injunction depends on the plaintiff's ability to show reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable
injury in the absence of an injunction.3 76 In a political abuse of hiring
hall case, the major issue will be the plaintiff's ability to prove irreparable injury. If the sole injury suffered by a union member in such a case
were loss of income due to denial of employment opportunities, one
might argue that this loss could be adequately compensated by money
damages. This, however, is only one of the harms suffered by the plaintiff, since the union officials use this deprivation to keep the plaintiff and
other union members from exercising their political and civil rights to
speak out on union political issues. It is the loss of these rights which is
irreparable.
In another context, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that
"[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." 37' 7 The Court has
373. Murphy, 774 F.2d at 119 (union business agent who told hiring hall dispatcher to remove
plaintiff's name from referral list held personally liable for damages); Keene, 569 F.2d at 1380-81
(union business agent who influenced the operation of the hiring hall held personally liable for
damages).
374. See Murphy, 774 F.2d at 119.
375. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ohio 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd
on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1074 (6th Cir. 1976); Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant Employees
Local 11, 300 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1970); Lucy v. Richardson, 67 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2638 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Gartner v. Soloner, 220 F. Supp. 115 (E.D. Pa.
1963); Stark v. Twin City Carpenters Dist. Council, 219 F. Supp. 528 (D. Minn. 1963).
376. Maceria v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8,15 (lst Cir. 1981); Ostrowski v. Local 1-2, Utility Workers,
530 F. Supp. 208, 215-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 241 F.
Supp. 895, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd, 330 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1964).
377. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976).
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also acknowledged that the LMRDA rights implicated in a political
abuse case are similar to those enjoyed under the first amendment.
"Congress modeled Title I after the Bill of Rights, and the legislators
intended § 101(a)(2) to restate a principal First Amendment value-the
right to speak one's mind without fear of reprisal. '3 78 The right to speak
one's mind is certainly lost where a member suffers the reprisal of loss of
income. This loss also serves to chill the free speech rights of other union
members who want to avoid similar economic punishment. Such a
showing surely meets the requirement of irreparable harm. The deprivation of the right to participate in union affairs is a loss which cannot
adequately be compensated.3 79 A preliminary injunction in such a case
would require the union to refrain from discriminating against the plaintiff in job referrals and to restore her name to its proper place on the
3
referral list.

b.

8 °

Section 501

A section 501 claim can be filed only against individual union officers, agents or representatives; the section does not provide for suit to
be filed against a labor organization.38 1 The statute also states the remedy available-recovery of damages, securing an accounting, or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization. 382 Thus, while
this section of the LMRDA can not be used to assert a purely personal
wrong and request relief for purely personal benefit,3 83 the correction of
the
wrongful acts directed against a specific member may redound to
3 84
whole.
a
as
organization
the
and
benefit of the entire membership
Those union officers who abuse their positions of authority to advance their personal political goals injure not only those members who
are the targets of the abuse but also the organization as a whole, as their
actions subvert the normal democratic processes of the union. "The restoration of orderly democratic processes to the local union is clearly a
benefit to the labor organization, and a proper subject of concern to the
entire membership."38' 5 Vindication of personal rights in such a case also
benefits the union.
Appropriate relief in that situation would include an injunction requiring the union officers to refrain from violating or chilling union
378. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at I 11.
379. Maceria, 649 F.2d at 18; Ostrowski, 530 F. Supp. at 215-16; Gleason, 300 F. Supp. at 125758; Axelrod v. Stoltz, 264 F. Supp. 536, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aff'd, 391 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1968).
380. Accord Revette v. International Ass'n of Bridge Workers, 740 F.2d 892 (11 th Cir. 1984).
381. Stelling, 587 F.2d at 1385-86; Pignotti, 477 F.2d at 832.
382. 29 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982). See supra note 110 (text of statute).
383. Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1968).
384. Accord Pignotti,477 F.2d at 835-36; Nelson v. Johnson, 212 F. Supp. 233, 298 (D. Minn.
1963), aff'd, 325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1963); see Comment, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 224, at 1194.
385. Pignotti, 477 F.2d at 835.

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 9:339

members' rights under the LMRDA, and to perform their duties and use
their offices for the benefit of the union and its members rather than for
the advancement of their personal ambitions.38 6
Some commentators have suggested that appropriate relief under
section 501 could include removal of the offending individual from union
office. 38 7 This suggestion is based on remedies granted by courts in common law trust cases.3 88 But just as the fiduciary duty imposed by section
501 should be interpreted in light of the "special problems and functions
of a labor organization," so should the appropriateness of the remedy.
Indiscriminate application of conventional trust law in this context overlooks the central role played by the democratic process in labor organizations. Union officers are elected; trustees are appointed. Moreover, the
LMRDA contains a specific provision dealing with the removal of
elected officials guilty of serious misconduct.3 89 Thus, while it would be
inappropriate for a court to remove an elected official under section 501,
such a remedy could be appropriate where the guilty official or representative was not elected.39 °
5. Attorney Fees
The "American rule" governing the apportionment of attorney fees
and expenses in civil litigation provides for each party to bear its own
costs.

391

Exceptions to this general rule are found in statutory or con-

tractual authorizations or in the equitable power of the courts.392
Although section 102 contains no statutory authority for the award of
attorney fees, the Supreme Court in Hall v. Cole held that a court could
exercise its equitable power under the "common benefit" rationale to
award reasonable attorney fees to successful plaintiffs in Title I
lawsuits.39 3
The common benefit theory is applied where a plaintiff's successful
litigation confers "a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs
proportionately among them."' 39 4 This rationale does not require a finding of bad faith on the defendant's part. Rather it is based on the premise
that where a plaintiff's action redounds to the benefit of a group, it would
386. Accord DiGiulian, 739 F.2d at 653. See also Nelson, 212 F. Supp. at 288.
387. Dugan, supra note 215, at 294-95; Wollett, FiduciaryProblems Under Landrum-Griffin, 13
N.Y.U. LAB. CONF. 267, 283 (1960).
388.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 199 (1959).

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

29 U.S.C. § 481(h) (1982).
See Clark, supra note 215, at 470-71.
Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 4.
Id. at 4 & nn.5-6.
Id.
Id. at 5 (quoting Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite, 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970)).
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be unfair to have her shoulder the entire burden of litigation costs while
allowing the group to enjoy the benefits.3 95
A plaintiff's Title I suit attacking political abuse of a hiring hall
clearly reaps a benefit for all union members. When an individual member is denied job opportunities in retaliation for exercising political rights
under Title I, the rights of all members are threatened. The example set
is an effective one, chilling the exercise of Title I rights by other members
and suppressing democracy within the union. Thus, in vindicating his
own rights the union member dispels the chill and revitalizes all members' rights.396 District courts accordingly have the discretion to award
the successful Title I plaintiff in a political abuse of the hiring hall case
reasonable attorney fees from the union treasury.3 9 7
Section 501(b) contains an express provision allowing the court to
"allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action under this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting this suit.., and to compensate
such member for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in
connection with the litigation."3 9 A literal interpretation of this clause
would limit an award of litigation fees and expenses to those cases where
a monetary recovery was achieved, and limit the amount of the award to
a "reasonable part" of that recovery. The courts, however, have uniformly rejected such a restrictive reading of the statute.3 99
The courts have found a liberal construction necessary to effectuate
the purposes of the LMRDA. ° The concept of "recovery" is not limited to monetary benefits but is broad enough to include any type of benefit bestowed on the union as a result of the lawsuit." ° Moreover,
Congress has entrusted to individual union members responsibility for
enforcing the fiduciary obligations for the benefit of the organization as a
whole, and members and their counsel should be protected through the
award of fees and expenses whenever such benefit is realized. 2 Of
course, where there is a monetary recovery for the benefit of the organi395. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. at 5-7, 15.
396. Accord id. at 8.
397. Murphy, 774 F.2d at 127 (upholding district court's fees award); Vandeventer, 579 F.2d at
1380 (ordering district court to consider fees motion).
398. See supra note 110 (text of statute).
399. See, e.g., Kerr, 466 F.2d at 1278; Norris, 383 F.2d at 742-43; Bakery Workers Int'l Union v.
Ratner, 335 F.2d 691, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 220 F.
Supp. 735, 737 (E.D. Pa. 1963); see J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, supra note 102, at 303-04;

Comment, Facilitatingthe Union Member'sRight to Sue Under Sections 412 and 501(b) of LandrumGriffin, 58 GEO. L.J. 221, 237-38 (1969) [hereinafter Comment, Right to Sue].
400. It has been suggested, however, that a liberal reading is contrary to the congressional intent
found in the legislative history of § 501(b). Clark, supra note 215, at 471-75; accord Bartosic &
Minda, Union Fiduciaries,Attorneys and Conflicts ofInterest, 15 U.C.D. L. REv. 227, 339-40 (1981).
401. Cohen, 220 F. Supp. at 737.
402. Norris, 383 F.2d at 742-43; Ratner, 335 F.2d at 696; Comment, Right to Sue, supra note
399, at 237-38.
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4°3
zation, the resulting fund may prove a source for the payment of fees.
A benefit to the union and its members is surely realized when an
individual successfully stops a union officer or representative from abusing her position of authority in making referrals from a hiring hall for the
purpose of punishing political enemies and rewarding political allies.
When the members know that their opportunities for employment will
no longer be jeopardized if they engage in union political activity, they
will be more inclined to exercise their civil and political rights within the
organization. Increased membership participation within the union can
only serve to strengthen it as a democratic institution responsive to, and
reflective of, the will of its members.

V
A

COMMENTARY ON THE COMPARISON

From a policy perspective, the LMRDA is the more appropriate
vehicle for challenging political abuse of hiring halls. One of its purposes
is specifically to protect union members from union officers who misuse
their positions of authority and suppress democratic rights within the
union. This is exactly the situation presented by a political abuse of hiring hall case. Both the manner in which the rights are enforced and the
liability imposed on offending parties are directed toward effectuating
that purpose.
LMRDA litigation is controlled by the plaintiff and his attorney,
while in suits under the NLRA the decision to litigate is vested excluAlso, the availability of discovery prosively in the General Counsel.'
cedures in federal court under LMRDA aids the private litigant in
obtaining a complete picture of the misuse of the hiring hall and the
injury suffered. In many cases, this picture can only be pieced together
through deposition of union officers and employees, employers who obtain their workers through the hiring hall, and other union members, as
well as documents such as hiring hall lists, referral requests and referral
slips. Where referral records are not kept, documents such as health,
welfare and pension fund contribution lists can indicate who worked for
which employers during what period of time. Where records are kept,
the ability to check their accuracy and completeness through pretrial discovery is a necessity." 5
The availability of preliminary injunctive relief in LMRDA suits
provides another major advantage over NLRA proceedings, in which the
individual being denied job referrals can effectively be starved out of the
403. Rater, 335 F.2d at 697. A thorough and excellent analysis of the issues involved in the
computation of attorney fees can be found in Bartosic & Minda, supra note 400, at 346-59.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
405. See supra note 76.
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union" while awaiting disposition of his complaint. The ability to obtain a preliminary injunction in such a situation is of primary interest to
a plaintiff.4 "7
The shorter time period for obtaining a court-enforceable order for a
successful litigant in an LMRDA suit is a further advantage. On a national level, the median time from the filing of a responsive pleading in
federal district court to trial was fifteen months in 1980 and fourteen
months in 1981.4"8 During this same time period, it took approximately
two years to obtain a court-enforceable order under the NLRA.4 °9
Further, the remedies available under the LMRDA more readily
serve the need presented in a political abuse of hiring hall case. First,
those individuals responsible for abusing their authority and retaliating
against political enemies can be held personally liable.41 0 Second, in
those situations where malice is present, punitive damages may be
awarded. Last, the victim is eligible for compensatory damages which
reimburse her not only for work-related losses,4" 1 ' but for all damages
proximately caused by the unlawful conduct. These types of remedies
serve as a powerful deterrent to those union officers who would seek to
consolidate their institutional positions at the expense of members'
rights. Moreover, the complete remedy afforded the victim serves to encourage other union members to exercise their political rights without
fear of severe, uncompensated loss due to officer reprisal.
While the administrative nature of the proceedings makes it rela406. See supra note 42.
407. Preliminary relief is available under the NLRA pursuant to § 10(j), 29 U.S.C. § 160(j)
(1982). After an unfair labor practice complaint has been issued, the NLRB may petition the district
court for a restraining order pending the issuance of a Board decision in the case. The Board's
decision to seek § 10(j) relief pursuant to a charging party's request lies solely with the Board and is
discretionary, not mandatory. When a request for a § 10(j) injunction is received by the Regional
Director, she notifies the Division of Advice, Office of the General Counsel, in Washington, D.C.
The General Counsel must then ask for, and receive, authorization from the Board prior to filing a
request for § 10() injunction. See generally NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL
10310-10312 (1983); Helm, The Practicalityof Increasingthe Use of NLRA
Section 10(J)Injunctions, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 599 (1985); Note, Section 100) of the National Labor
Relations Act: A Legislative, Administrative and Judicial Look at a Potentially Effective (But Seldom
Used) Remedy, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1021 (1978). In 1980 the Board filed a total of 50 § 10(j)
petitions, only 5 of which sought relief against a union. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 205 (1980). In 1981 it
filed 45 petitions, and only 4 against a union. 46 NLRB ANN. REP. 139 (1981). There is only one
reported case of a § 10(j) injunction specifically involving a discriminatory union hiring hall. Brown
v. National Union of Marine Cooks, 104 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Cal. 1951). Thus, while it is possible to
obtain a preliminary injunction in a political abuse of hiring hall case under the NLRA, the likelihood of persuading the Board to seek such relief runs counter to established pattern.
408.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS

134 (1983).
409. See supra note 101.
410. Personal liability is not imposed under the NLRA. See supra text accompanying note 95.
411. The NLRA limits monetary relief to work-related losses. See supra text accompanying
notes 91-94.
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tively inexpensive for an individual to pursue his case through the
NLRA,4" 2 the availability of attorney fees to the successful litigant under
section 102 and section 501(b) of the LMRDA should help to equalize
the cost of pursuing a case under the two statutes.
CONCLUSION

Hiring halls perform a valuable role in bringing together qualified,
available workers and employers in certain industries. In the operation
of hiring halls, however, opportunities are present for union leaders to
manipulate the referral of applicants to the advantage of their friends and
the disadvantage of their enemies. Where the manipulation is motivated
by internal union political considerations, rights and liabilities under
both the NLRA and the LMRDA are implicated.
In protecting an employee's right to engage in union activities, the
NLRA broadly defines the meaning of union activity, encompassing not
only external union proselytizing and union activity at the workplace but
also internal union political activity. The focus of this statute, however,
is on the relationship between the employer and its employees and their
union representative. Accordingly, a central concern is ensuring the employees' ability to organize so as to equalize their bargaining power with
the employer.
The LMRDA expressly protects a union member's right to engage
in internal union political conduct. This protection is not a corollary of
the statute's main focus; rather, the central theme behind this legislation
is the regulation of the relationship between a union and its members. As
such, its goal is to establish and preserve union democracy.
Thus, while both the NLRA and the LMRDA provide mechanisms
for attacking political abuse of hiring halls and compensating the victims
of that abuse, the enforcement and remedial provisions contained in the
LMRDA are more suited to accomplishing the larger objective at stake.
The fundamental goal is the protection of the union-member relationship
envisioned by Congress, a relationship the hallmark of which is union
democracy. The interest in preserving union democracy extends beyond
the individual union members and concerns society as a whole, because
the functions performed by unions influence not only workers and employers but also the general public.4" 3 Toward that end, the litigant's
subsidiary goals-restoration of democratic procedures within the union,
punishment of union officials who constructively steal income from the
members by manipulating job referrals, and vindication of the members'
political and civil rights within the union-are best achieved through the
412. The investigation and litigation of NLRA cases is handled by tax-paid employees.
413. See Hartley, The Fundamentals of Democracy in Union Government, 32 CATH. U.L. REV.
13 (1982); supra note 44.
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LMRDA. Achievement of these goals in turn supports attainment of the
larger objective.

